Securing USSD in mobile financial transactions: a  practical proposal for m-finance by Cravo, Paula Margarida Mendonça da Silva
  
UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA 
FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS 
DEPARTAMENTO DE INFORMÁTICA 
 
 
 
 
 
SECURING USSD IN MOBILE FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
(A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR M-FINANCE) 
 
 
 
 
 
Paula Margarida Mendonça da Silva Cravo 
 
 
 
 
MESTRADO EM SEGURANÇA INFORMÁTICA 
Dezembro 2011 
  
 
 UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA 
FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS 
DEPARTAMENTO DE INFORMÁTICA 
 
 
 
 
SECURING USSD IN MOBILE FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
(A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR M-FINANCE) 
 
 
 
Paula Margarida Mendonça da Silva Cravo 
 
 
Tese orientada pelo Professor Jason Hong 
e co-orientada por Professor Dr. Marcelo Pasin 
 
 
 
 
MESTRADO EM SEGURANÇA INFORMÁTICA 
Dezembro 2011  
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
This work would not be possible if it wasn’t for the help of a lot of people, and I 
would like to refer some of the most important persons that supported me throughout 
this Master thesis and during the MSc graduation work. 
First of all, I must refer Professor Jason Hong, from CMU, who was very 
attentive, questioning me about my decisions and guiding me through studies paths 
that came out to be this work. Without his help, I would still be immersed in 
document analysis, searching for a possible solution for my quest. Thank you very 
much, Professor Hong. 
Secondly, I would like to thank PT and PT Inovação, who promoted this work 
through CMU Portugal program and gave me all the necessary tools and support to 
do it. It was a marvelous experience to be able to execute part of this study in the 
United States and an opportunity to meet different realities. 
I would also like to thank all my MSc colleagues: André Cruz, Carlos Lopes 
Pereira, Nuno Antunes, Nuno Medeiros, Paulo Ferreira, Rui Martins and Vitor Leitão. 
They made this 16 months feel less terrifying, although they were themselves also 
buried in lots of work. Thank you, guys! We’ll keep in touch. I also want to thank all 
the teachers and TA’s, especially those who were closer to me, at FCUL, in Lisbon: 
iii 
 
Professor António Casimiro, Professor Paulo Veríssimo, Professor José Rufino, 
Professor Nuno Neves, Professor Marcelo Pasin, Professor Alysson Bessani, and 
Professor Miguel Correia, but also João Craveiro and, of course, Tiago Carvalho. 
My thank you goes also to my colleagues at PT Inovação: Luís Cortesão, José 
Bonet, Manuel Aguiar, Jorge Gonçalves, António Santos, Raúl Costa, Joel Ferreira 
and José Eduardo Rocha, Cristina Cabral, Lara Brito (thank you for everything, 
Lara!), Hugo Cabral, João Bica Osório, and many, many, many others! To all of 
them, thank you for your friendship! 
Of course, I cannot forget my family, who sacrificed themselves for me during 
these 13 months living 250 km away from home, and another 3 months in another 
continent. They took care of my house, finances and cats, drove me back and forth 
and were irreplaceable. Thanks, Mom, Olga, Pedro and Sara. 
Finally, my last ‘obrigado’ goes to Silkshadow, Fernando Almeida's rock band. Their 
debut album was my soundtrack for these final weeks, and gave me the speed and 
energy I was already missing. Good work, guys! 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, for all the support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
Resumo 
 
1. Introdução 
O trabalho que se apresenta propõe uma solução de segurança para um aspeto do 
sistema de mobile-Finance da Portugal Telecom (PT). A proponente, PT Inovação, 
sugeriu que este estudo se centrasse na segurança do canal de acesso USSD da 
sua plataforma de gestão de transações financeiras, Financial Transaction Manager 
(FTM). A Figure 1 mostra a arquitetura funcional do FTM.  
Os participantes nas transações analisadas são: 
 O Utilizador: usará a plataforma FTM para depositar e levantar dinheiro na 
sua conta do sistema, efetuar pagamentos, compras e transferências, etc. 
 O Agente: representa uma instituição e tem a função de registar Utilizadores 
e aceitar depósitos e levantamentos destes. 
  O FTM: coordena e controla todas as transações, regista Agentes e 
Utilizadores, valida e consolida os movimentos, etc. 
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Sendo o Agente essencial na conversão de valores monetários entre o FTM e o 
mundo real, recebendo e entregando dinheiro ao Utilizador, considera-se que é um 
participante suscetível de ser tentado a executar ou a sofrer ações maliciosas. Por 
esse motivo a nossa proposta centra-se essencialmente na segurança das 
comunicações USSD entre o Agente e o FTM. 
O protocolo USSD é um protocolo que permite enviar mensagens de texto no canal 
de sinalização GSM, tal como o SMS, mas contrariamente a este não é armazenado 
até ser enviado. Encontra-se disponível em todos os equipamentos GSM, é 
bidirecional e de tempo-real, e apresenta tempos de resposta curtos relativamente 
ao SMS. É por isso um forte candidato como canal de acesso para algumas 
soluções de m-Finance fornecidas pela PT, mas o facto de não oferecer segurança 
constituiu um problema. 
Este trabalho faz um estudo do modelo de ataque do protocolo financeiro já 
existente, propõe uma solução que garante segurança nas comunicações USSD 
entre o Agente e o FTM e sugere medidas que aumentam o grau de segurança do 
sistema em geral. 
Para tal, partimos dos seguintes pressupostos: 
 O Agente já se encontra registado na plataforma FTM. 
 O Utilizador regista-se apenas com um Agente. 
 O Utilizador não tem conhecimento prévio sobre o Agente antes de se 
registar com ele. 
O protocolo já existente na plataforma define alguns passos que os participantes 
devem seguir e que se encontram descritos em Figure 3, Figure 4 e Figure 5. 
viii 
 
 
2. Modelo de Ataque 
O modelo de ataque para o protocolo de comunicações analisado pressupõe que o 
Agente tem um dispositivo móvel com alguma capacidade de processamento, se 
encontra certificado pelo FTM e que as comunicações entre o Agente e o FTM são 
encriptadas. Os ataques possíveis podem ser classificados como: 
 Ataques ao equipamento móvel: inclui perda ou roubo do dispositivo, 
presença de aplicações maliciosas no dispositivo, acesso ao dispositivo por 
outros canais não referenciados e não autorizados, utilizador malicioso, 
clonagem do cartão SIM. 
 Ataques à rede: incluindo a personificação do operador de rede, 
personificação do FTM e personificação do Agente. 
 Ataques ao protocolo e aos algoritmos criptográficos: incluindo ataques de 
repetição ou reinjecção, MSISDN spoofing, ataques de homem-no-meio, 
ataques em conluio e ataques criptográficos. 
 Ataques ao operador da rede: inclui perda, atraso ou corrupção de 
mensagens, inundação de mensagens (flooding) e modificação de 
mensagens. 
A mitigação de todos os ataques referidos pode não ser possível e o nível de 
segurança alcançado dependerá da capacidade de processamento do equipamento 
móvel. 
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Do lado do Utilizador a mitigação de alguns dos ataques tem que ter em 
consideração o tipo de equipamento que este possui, e que classificamos do 
seguinte modo: 
 Categoria 1: não é capaz de executar operações criptográficas ou não 
permite aplicações SIM. 
 Categoria 2: permite aplicações SIM e possui alguma capacidade de 
processamento. 
 Categoria 3: smartphones ou outros, programáveis e personalizáveis, com 
componentes TCB. 
Os ataques de repetição ou reinjeção podem ser evitados através da introdução de 
valores aleatórios ou de utilização única nas mensagens. Os ataques do tipo 
homem-no-meio podem ser mitigados através de confirmações fora-da-banda ou 
multicaminho e os ataques de negação de serviço pela exaustão de recursos do 
FTM podem ser prevenidos através de puzzles ou desafios ao Agente ou Utilizador, 
exigindo interação humana. 
A confidencialidade das transações entre o Utilizador e o FTM não está 
completamente resolvida uma vez que não impomos ao Utilizador a necessidade de 
encriptar a informação. As comunicações USSD serão seguras desde que 
encriptadas com chaves de curta duração e tal não é possível em equipamentos de 
categoria 1. No entanto, mesmo nestes equipamentos é possível garantir algum 
grau de segurança pelo uso de desafios, puzzles, e/ou confirmações fora-de-banda 
ou com multicaminho. Propomos o uso de confirmações fora-de-banda baseadas 
em segredos conhecidos apenas do FTM e do interveniente (Agente ou Utilizador), 
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como um código secreto ou uma matriz de códigos. O FTM deverá forçar o 
interveniente a mudar estes códigos periodicamente. 
No caso do Agente, propomos encriptar sempre as comunicações com o FTM 
usando chaves de curta duração que são geradas apenas se o Agente conseguir 
enviar corretamente um código secreto, conhecido só dele e do FTM. Este 
procedimento evitará que um atacante consiga personificar o Agente. Um Agente 
malicioso só conseguirá ter sucesso relativo e receber o dinheiro do Utilizador, não 
o registando no FTM, se simultaneamente for capaz de executar um ataque de 
homem no meio intercetando e modificando a mensagem de confirmação que o 
FTM envia ao Utilizador. Será eventualmente detetado pelo Utilizador por 
comparação de saldos da conta e este pode apresentar queixa do Agente 
desonesto. 
 
3. Protocolo 
O protocolo de segurança proposto, USSL/UTLS, baseia-se em SSL/TLS tendo sido 
modificado para poder ser transmitido numa mensagem USSD. O tamanho máximo 
da mensagem USSD é 182 bytes com um formato apresentado na Figure 6. 
Partindo do pressuposto de que o FTM tem um conjunto de chaves pública/privada, 
e que o Agente conhece a chave pública do FTM, o Agente inicia uma sessão 
USSL/UTLS usando um handshake semelhante ao do SSL/TLS. O formato das 
tramas SSL/TLS está representado na Figure 7 e Figure 8, e calcula o tamanho em 
bytes de cada uma das mensagens trocadas. Este estudo está traduzido nas 
tabelas Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 e Table 8.  
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Após a fase de autenticação USSL/UTLS são geradas as chaves MAC e de 
encriptação para o FTM e Agente. A segunda fase do processo requer que o Agente 
confirme a sua identificação através de um código pessoal e está representada na 
Table 9. 
Propomos a adição de alguns passos ao processo de registo do Utilizador: o Agente 
entrega ao Utilizador um envelope selado com um identificador exterior, contendo 
um código secreto ou um conjunto de códigos secretos, informa o FTM do 
identificador entregue e o FTM informa o Utilizador desse facto. Este envelope 
contém o código, ou códigos secretos partilhados apenas entre o Utilizador e o FTM 
e que serão usados para confirmar operações. 
O procedimento para depósito de uma quantia pelo Utilizador não se altera, mas o 
procedimento para levantamento deve ser modificado, evitando que o Utilizador 
indique o seu PIN na primeira mensagem, e confirmando a operação de 
levantamento com a introdução do código secreto partilhado com o FTM. 
 
4. Análise de Desempenho e Discussão 
O desempenho do sistema está essencialmente dependente das capacidades do 
dispositivo móvel, do servidor FTM, do número de mensagens trocadas, do tempo 
de transmissão USSD e do tempo de processamento USSD.  
Não é possível reduzir o número de mensagens de handshake sem comprometer a 
segurança, mas é possível limitar o número de vezes que as chaves temporárias 
são criadas associando-as a um temporizador que as invalida ao fim de algum 
tempo.  
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O timeout das mensagens USSD também pode ser ajustado para cada mensagem 
usando um valor mínimo possível. Na fase de autenticação do Agente, com um 
timeout de 10 segundos por mensagem, teremos um máximo de 100 segundos para 
concluir a autenticação. 
Existem limitações na implementação de protocolos de segurança em dispositivos 
de categoria 1 e embora o protocolo proposto coloque o máximo de esforço no FTM, 
algumas operações têm que ser executadas no dispositivo. 
A nossa proposta, por se basear no protocolo SSL/TLS, permite fazer alterações às 
bibliotecas criptográficas usadas e inclusivamente suportar várias versões do 
protocolo, possibilitando a coexistência de diferentes níveis de segurança. 
 
5. Conclusões 
O esquema de segurança sobre o canal de acesso USSD do sistema m-Finance da 
PT apresenta várias vulnerabilidades. Este trabalho propõe algumas modificações 
de forma a garantir a segurança das comunicações, especialmente entre os 
Agentes e o FTM. Sugerimos o uso de mecanismos que aumentam a segurança de 
forma geral, bem como a adaptação do protocolo SSL/TLS de forma a ser possível 
usá-lo nas transmissões USSD. A esse protocolo chamámos USSL/UTLS. Estamos 
convictos que a nossa proposta para o uso de USSL/UTLS é viável em 
equipamentos de categoria 2 e 3, e que aumentará a segurança nas comunicações 
entre o Agente e a plataforma FTM. 
Na generalidade, a nossa proposta requer um mínimo de intervenção por parte do 
utilizador e apresenta medidas de segurança adicionais para autenticação do 
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Agente. A solução que advogamos assegura a confidencialidade, integridade e 
autenticidade das mensagens trocadas entre o Agente e o FTM. A combinação de 
PIN e código de confirmação do Agente e a chave pública do FTM asseguram 
igualmente o não-repúdio entre estes dois intervenientes. 
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Abstract 
 
This work analyses an existing mobile-finance scheme at Portuguese PT Inovação, 
targeting users that do not have a bank account, and using the USSD 
communication channel to process financial transactions between three parties: the 
User, an Agent that represents, or acts on behalf of, an institution, but not 
necessarily a bank or a financial one, and the Financial Transaction Manager (FTM) 
that manages the Agent network, the Users and the transactions made. 
We start by analyzing USSD communications: by itself it is not a secure 
communications channel, but it is available at every GSM device, allows for instant 
messaging services and is inter-operable, i.e. is not telecom dependent. Besides, it 
can run on commodity mobile phones, and requires practically no software 
download. From the user point of view, it resembles a normal text message and 
requires no special communications contract with the telecom operator other than 
the one that allows for sending text messages. It presents some security issues, 
namely, no authentication, no confidentiality, no integrity. We demonstrate that these 
issues can be solved through the use of end-to-end secure protocols on top of USSD 
in addition to other security mechanisms.  
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PT Inovação’s m-finance scheme already implements a set of operations and 
financial transactions. We analyze the system’s threat model and we propose a 
solution that will protect a specific communication path, namely, between the Agent 
and the FTM. We suggest the implementation of SSL/TLS over USSD, a lightweight 
version that we call USSL/UTLS. We demonstrate that it is feasible to implement 
such security mechanism on a USSD communication channel, and that it provides 
end-to-end security over the network communication path, at least if the devices 
present some processing capabilities. We propose some possible implementation 
paths, and conduct a brief performance analysis.  
 
 
Keywords: USSD, SSL/TLS, m-finance, confidentiality, authenticity 
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Glossary 
 
2G second generation of mobile cellular phones and mobile 
telecommunications standards. 
3G third generation of mobile cellular phones and mobile telecommunications 
standards. 
CAMEL Customized Applications for Mobile Enhanced Logic: a GSM 2+ 
feature that makes world wide support of Operator Specific Services 
possible. 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute: independent, 
non-profit, standardization organization in the telecommunications 
industry in Europe. 
FTM Financial Transaction Manager: the manager responsible for the control 
of financial transactions in PT Inovação’s mobile finance system. 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications: a standard set developed 
by ETSI to describe technologies for 2G digital cellular networks 
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code: a mechanism for message 
authentication using cryptographic hash functions. 
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity: a unique 15-digt code stored 
in the mobile phone SIM card, used to identify an individual user on a 
GSM network. 
IN Intelligent Network: a standard network architecture intended for fixed 
as well as mobile telecom networks, allowing operators to provide value-
added services in besides standard telecom services. 
MAC Message Authentication Code: a piece of information used to 
authenticate a message. 
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm: an algorithm based on cryptographic hash 
functions. 
MSISDN Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number: a number 
uniquely identifying a subscription in a GSM or UMTS mobile network, 
corresponding to a phone number of the SIM card. 
OTA Over the Air: a technology used to communicate with, download 
applications to, and manage a SIM card without being connected 
physically to the card 
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PIN Personal Identification Number: a secret numeric password shared 
between a user and a system that can be used to authenticate the user to 
the system.  
PT Portugal Telecom, S.A.: a telecommunications provider present in many 
countries, that provides a full range of fixed and mobile 
telecommunications services. 
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman public key cryptographic algorithm: an 
algorithm for public-key encryption. 
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1: and algorithm for computing a condensed 
representation of a message or a data file. 
SIM Subscriber Identification Module: an integrated circuit that securely 
stores the IMSI and the related key used to identify and authenticate 
subscriber on mobile telephony devices. It is kept on a removable SIM 
card that can be transferred between different mobile devices.  
SMS Short Message Service: a text messaging service component of phone, 
web or mobile communications systems that uses a standardized 
communications protocol that allow the exchange of short text messages 
between devices. 
SMS-C Short Message Service Center: a network element responsible for 
handling the SMS operations of a wireless network. 
SSL/TLS Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security protocols: 
cryptographic protocols that provide communication security over the 
internet, designed to prevent eavesdropping and tampering of the 
information. 
STK SIM Tool Kit: a standard of the GSM system that enables the SIM to 
initiate actions which can be used for various value-added services. 
TTP Trusted Third Party: A security authority, or its agent, trusted by other 
entities with respect to security related activities.  
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card: the smart card used in mobile 
terminals in GSM and UMTS networks, which ensures the integrity and 
security of all kinds of data.  
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System: third generation 
mobile cellular technology for networks based on the GSM standard.  
USAT USIM Application Toolkit: the equivalent of STK for 3G networks.  
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module: a software application for UMTS 
mobile phones that runs on a UICC, which is inserted in a 3G mobile 
phone.  
xxii 
 
USSD Unstructured Supplementary Services Data: a protocol built into the 
GSM standard used by GSM cellular phones to communicate with the 
service provider's servers. It is available to all devices since 2G GSM. 
WAP Wireless Application Protocol:  an open, global specification that allows 
mobile users with wireless devices to easily access information over a 
mobile wireless network.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Securing mobile-Finance (m-Finance), the topic of this work, was proposed by PT 
Inovação, the R&D branch of the Portuguese communications operator Portugal 
Telecom, PT. 
In this chapter, we present the motivation for the work, and our main goals and 
achievements. At the end of the chapter, we present the organization of the rest of 
the document. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Mobile-finance (e.g., mobile-payment systems, contactless or remote, branchless 
banking models, airtime transfers, etc) introduces several security issues that need 
to be urgently addressed by all the actors in this new and thriving business area.  
Remote payments and remittances, deposits via ATM, the operator’s financial 
transaction platform, and the interface with banks and other financial institutions deal 
with many security requirements concerning the type of communication (USSD, 
SMS, etc), the infrastructure responsible for processing and storing financial 
transactions, and the communication between each participant. 
In the case of emerging economies there is a special interest in domestic 
remittances and international remittances through financial brokers (like Western 
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Union, Belgacom ICS, etc). Usually the communication is done in IPSec or SSL, but 
when considering the case of emerging economies, like Brazil or Morocco, other 
types may need to be available. In this type of countries economy is growing very 
rapidly but communications infrastructure is not yet fully developed and many of its 
citizens have a low literacy level and low incomes. Modern services that are based 
on a good telecommunications infrastructure, like banking, remote commerce, etc, 
are not evenly spread throughout the country, and some regions may be more 
developed than others. The necessity for other types of secure communications 
comes from the existence of a large quantity of individuals with low-literacy, no bank 
account, no access to top Internet technologies (like value-added services, data 
services or broadband services), but owning mobile devices, although not 
necessarily top technology devices. 
With this work, PT intends to have analyzed the security mechanisms needed for the 
some usage scenarios on the m-Finance system, having in mind the constantly 
changing technological platforms and usability needs on the markets PT intend to 
address. Therefore PT needs to have one or more prototypes developed to test the 
different security solution approaches available for several cultural and economic 
development realities. Such realities include developed countries, like most 
European countries, in which potential users have easy access to internet 
technologies and top mobile devices, as well as emerging economies, like Brazil, 
Morocco and others, where many potential users have limited financial capacities, 
little or no access to internet technologies, and yet own a personal, although limited, 
mobile phone. These different solutions approaches should allow for the exploration 
of several types of secure communication channels that can be used for a financial 
transaction. 
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The company already supports a mobile financial platform, the Financial Transaction 
Manager (FTM), briefly described in the following Figure 1 depicturing its functional 
architecture. The FTM platform is part of PT largest m-Finance system that is meant 
to provide m-Finance services to clients: banks, financial institutions, brokers, 
commerce retailers, etc. 
 
 
Figure 1 – FTM platform functional architecture: possible communications channels and system core 
components. Highlighted are the SMS/USSD access channel and the security core component 
covered by this work. 
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This architecture is composed of three main blocks, responsible for providing the 
access channels, payment adaptors and the system core components. The focus of 
this work is the Security Core Component and the SMS/USSD1 access channel. 
The existing m-Finance platform already establishes a number of participants 
involved in several types of transactions. These transactions include the ones the 
User can execute if he wishes to use the e-money stored in his m-Finance account 
to do some financial operations, like  
 pay for some products or services at a m-Finance valid merchant;  
 transfer some amount from his m-Finance account to his bank account; 
 transfer some amount from his m-Finance account to another m-Finance 
user; 
 recharge his m-Finance account with some amount by instructing a transfer 
from his bank account to his m-Finance account; 
 recharge his m-Finance account with some amount by going to a m-Finance 
Agent or broker in order to convert some cash into m-Finance account; 
 convert some amount stored in his m-Finance account into current coins and 
banknotes. 
The m-Finance system presents some properties. Namely, it is a complement to 
traditional payment methods, it is flexible, convenient and ubiquitous. It is also a 
facilitator for a diversity of m-commerce services, like m-ticketing, m-retail, m-
banking, etc. Although this payment system can be connected to bank account 
payments, one of its advantages is that this is not a requirement, and the system can 
                                                          
1
 Although the access channel includes SMS, we will not cover that technology in this work. 
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be used by the segment with no bank accounts as well. This is achieved through the 
use of Agents, certified by the FTM platform, that take the necessary steps to 
convert money to or from e-money.  
An Agent is a person that represents, or acts on behalf of, an institution (but not 
necessarily a bank or a financial one), registering Users to the system, receiving 
money from a User when he commands a deposit to his system account or 
delivering money to the User when he executes a withdraw operation, among others. 
From time to time, Agents will deliver the received money to the institution they 
represent, or receive more money from it. Agents can be a network operator 
authorized dealer, other retailers like petrol stations, distributors supermarkets, etc, 
selected banks and other micro-Finance institutions, and basically anyone who the 
m-finance system agrees that can act on its behalf. 
Agents, like Users, can contact the FTM platform through a mobile device using any 
of the available access channels. In this work we assume that the chosen channel is 
USSD. This is not an uncommon choice because USSD is possible in every SMS-
capable GSM device (virtually, all GSM devices) and requires no special 
communications contract with the telecom operator other than the one that allows for 
sending text messages, which makes it less expensive than other access channels 
requiring explicit data communication, like Web/WAP. 
On the User side, the co-existence of different mobile devices generations is a 
problem we will have to address. We categorize the User’s devices into 3 categories: 
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 Category 1: Legacy devices: devices are not able to execute cryptographic 
functions due to their limited processing capabilities. We also include in this 
group those devices that do not support SIM applications; 
 Category 2: Medium capable devices: in this category we include devices that 
have some processing capabilities and that allow for SIM application install 
 Category 3: Top devices: in this category we included smartphones and 
similar devices. They allow for custom application installations and they 
provide some type of TCB components. 
We will analyze later the minimum requirements for the Agent’s device in order to 
assure a certain security level. 
The role of this Agent is depicted in Figure 2, where we can see the steps taken by a 
User that whishes to deposit or withdraw a certain amount. In this figure we can also 
see the role of other participants, like the bank and the Intelligent Network (IN) 
platform, the platform that is responsible for providing the financial service. 
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Figure 2 – m-Finance: Remittances communications sequence. The User can either directly contact 
the FTM to transfer, pay or recharge his mobile phone account or go to an Agent to deposit or 
withdraw money. In this case, the Agent requires a deposit/withdraw to the FTM in the User account 
and the FTM validates and registers the movement at its database and informs both Agent and User 
of its success or failure. Depending on the operation the User commanded, FTM will sinchronize the 
financial monetary operations with a bank, broker or other, or will invoke the IN platform to process 
recharges in the User’s account, for instance. 
 
In Step 1a, if the User wants to withdraw or deposit some money, he goes to an 
Agent and gives him the required information to process the transaction. Next, in 
Step 2, the Agent requires deposits or withdraws to the FTM in the User account. 
Optionally, the User can contact the FTM directly (through a preferred access 
channel) to transfer, pay or top-up his mobile phone account, not involving an Agent 
in this process. This is depicted in Step 1b, in Figure 2. The FTM then takes Step 3, 
FTM
Access Channel
Payment Adaptor
USER AGENT
3. VALIDATE, MOVEMENT & 
PERSIST
1a. DEPOSIT/WITHDRAW
1b. TRANSFER/ACCOUNT CHECK
M-PAYMENT/RECHARGE 2. DEPOSIT/WITHDRAW
4. BACKGROUND 
FINANCIAL 
OPERATION 4.RECHARGE
BANK IN
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to validate data and to register events and movements into its database. The User or 
Agent is informed of the success or failure of this operation. Finally, FTM takes the 
appropriated Step 4. In this case, the FTM may synchronize financial monetary 
operations with a bank or an international broker, or may invoke IN to process a 
recharge done with e-money. 
The role of the Agent is a key one, most especially to those without bank accounts. 
This is a major feature to certain economies, where bank agencies are not available 
at every corner and most people do not necessarily have a bank account, but most 
certainly possess a mobile phone. The Agent is the key to convert money into e-
money and vice-versa. Once the User has an m-Finance account, he is able to 
transfer e-money to or from another User, and buy services and products that would 
otherwise be unavailable. 
All operations may be executed through an available access channel, as depicted in 
Figure 1. PT Inovação proposed that this study would be done on the USSD 
communication channel. 
Presently, all GSM mobile phones have SMS/USSD capabilities but unlike SMS, 
USSD [1][2][3] is a session-oriented service and offers a real-time connection during 
a session, which allows for bi-directional exchange. The USSD session is defined as 
the sequence of messages being exchanged between the two parties. The real-time 
session is initiated between the mobile user and the USSD application platform when 
the service is invoked, allowing data to be sent back and forth between the mobile 
user and the USSD application platform until the service is completed. 
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Besides this property, USSD does not need to store and forward a message, which 
means it does not need a SMS-Center (SMS-C) to store any arriving message until 
being able to send it to the destiny or give up due to message timeout, the procedure 
that SMS follows. Hence USSD is much faster than a SMS message. One 
implication is that the device needs to be on for the messages to be delivered and 
read. This makes USSD more responsive than SMS, enforced by the fact that USSD 
messages present smaller timeouts. In case of failure in delivering a USSD 
message, the sender will be notified of the fact.  
Another interesting property is that USSD Phase 2 (and later) [2][3][4] supports both 
device-initiated (push) operations as well as network-initiated (pull) operations. 
Comparing the communications model, SMS messages usually are sent between 
two peers, where the sender actually sends the message to the SMS-C, indicating 
that it is intended to a destiny peer. The SMS-C is responsible for storing the 
message and forward it to the destiny as soon as possible, and deleting it after it was 
successfully sent or its timeout expired. USSD messages may be sent to the network 
operator’s USSD application platform where they trigger some kind of action, like 
executing some task or getting some information from the system concerning the 
sender (e.g. getting information on the pre-paid mobile account balance) or are sent 
by the USSD application to the mobile phone with information to the phone’s owner 
(for instance, alerting for the need to recharge a pre-paid service in order to continue 
to use it without service interruption), but are not stored. They are either almost 
immediately delivered/executed or not, and the sender is informed of the success or 
failure of it.  
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USSD is supported by WAP, SIM Application Toolkit and CAMEL.A USSD message 
is limited to a maximum of 182 alphanumeric characters. Typically, the message 
starts with an asterisk (*) and terminates with the number sign (#). Between these 
two delimiters there are some digits and/or alphanumeric characters, which may be 
separated by asterisks (*), to identify the action to be executed and the necessary 
parameters, when applicable. 
The user can directly create a USSD message by simply typing the proper 
alphanumeric sequence and press “call” to send the message, after which it will 
receive an answer from the USSD application. Another form of starting an USSD 
session is for the USSD service on the network operator’s USSD application server 
to contact the user so that he will have to introduce some values (again, 
alphanumeric characters) and answer back. In both cases, the USSD application 
may even offer some menus to the user and drive him through several options in 
order to provide a more complex interaction. The response from the application 
server usually takes a few seconds. 
The availability characteristics of USSD, as well as its universality – it is present in all 
GSM mobile phones – make it an interest candidate for a possible communications 
channel, and this work will study the possibility of implementing secure 
communications on a USSD channel. 
A USSD message will put as much load to the network as a SMS message, but SMS 
presents higher message timeouts that are not suitable for a communication scheme 
where we have message flows with several steps. To its favor, USSD messages flow 
are aggregated in sessions and can be controlled. As for USSD service pricing, it is 
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a contract agreement between the network operator and USSD service application 
provider that defines the cost of each USSD services access. 
The main aspects to be studied are highlighted in Figure 1: the security of mobile 
payments using USSD access channel as a communication channel. 
 
1.2 Goals 
Having in mind that PT’s m-Finance services partially target mobile phone users of 
emerging economies without bank accounts we can list three main challenges for 
this work: 
1 -  Find a protocol that is able be used on a USSD channel. This includes coping 
with USSD message size limitations but also we have to deal with 
performance limitations.  
2 -  Present some solutions suitable for mobile devices with reduced 
computational performance and capabilities. This can only be achieved with 
some limitations due to the computational demands of the cryptographic and 
hash calculations. In the case of category 3 devices (smartphones and 
similar), this is no big challenge, but we do not expect every service user to 
own such a device. Instead, we expect users to possess category 2 devices, 
and maybe some of them will have older, category 1 devices. We will see 
later how this will impact on our proposal. 
3 -  Present a solution that is usable and requires minimum user intervention, but 
at the same time offers some assurance that the person using the application 
is the expected one, and is not being impersonated.  
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As referred above, the role of the Agent is a key one. He is one possible participant 
responsible to convert money to e-money and vice-versa. His importance is even 
greater to Users with no bank accounts that will have limited options to process this 
conversion. One of the goals of this study is to assure a certain security level in Step 
1a and Step 2 of Figure 2. The fact that the Agent deals with money directly imposes 
as a requirement a certain degree of confidence during these steps. 
Finally, the presented solution has to be able to keep track of the operations 
executed and who ordered them, in order to provide audit information in case the 
system is tampered. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
This work will contribute with a proposal for secure communications over a USSD 
channel. The way we intend to assure security properties is by developing a 
lightweight SSL/TLS protocol, capable of being transmitted over a communications 
channel with limited bandwidth as well as limited message length. Our target is the 
population segment that do not own a bank account, do not have access to 
broadband internet access services and do not possess a high literacy level, but do 
possess a mobile device, possibly a top device (a smartphone, for example) but 
most certainly a lower level device, with smaller computational capabilities. We will 
see next how this will affect our proposal. 
Because this is not an isolated or theoretic analysis of a security solution for the 
USSD channel, but rather is intended to make use of it in its m-finance service, we 
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will also analyze the existing protocol and will propose security improvements 
whenever necessary. 
 
1.4 Document Structure 
This document is organized in the following way: in Chapter 2 present some related 
work to our solution; in Chapter 3 we describe the existing protocol and in Chapter 4 
we present a threat model; Chapter 5 describes our solution and Chapter 6 presents 
a brief survey of the implementation aspects; in Chapter 7 we conduct a 
performance analysis of the protocol while in Chapter 8 we present some more 
discussion and analysis of the solution we proposed; Chapter 9 is dedicated to some 
hints for future work and finally, Chapter 10 is dedicated to a summary and 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2  
Related Work 
There is plenty of literature related to m-finance and to USSD value-added 
applications on mobile transactions. In fact, almost every country and or operator 
has a customized solution for m-finance. Next we present only a few of the related 
works we found out to be more relevant to our own work. 
In [6], Kumar, Martin and O’Neill describe the India experience in m-commerce, 
focusing on “specific India ethnographic characteristics”. Their work is a survey of a 
possible implementation of m-commerce services supported in SMS, like paying for 
day-to-day services or goods, for instance, buying food or a bus ticket, or cash 
transfer between people, and taking advantages of the widespread penetration of 
mobile phones. Like this present work, they target the poorest section of the 
population, most of them without bank accounts and illiterate. However, the India 
specific environment presents to the authors some increased challenges, like the 
inhabitant’s habit of sharing sensitive information of their devices, for instance PIN 
numbers. Even so, the study focus on the importance of the number of human 
interaction required to complete a transaction, the system’s swift notifications to both 
participants of the transaction being held as well the both parties correct 
identification. The study also refers to the importance of m-Finance for financial 
inclusion of the populations of less developed areas. These aspects are also 
important to our work, and we will take them in account for our proposal. 
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Also in [8], Karunanayake, De Zoysa and Muftic, present a study referring the major 
benefits of m-commerce, specially focused on the no-bank-account and low-literacy 
segment of rural areas of developing countries. By the time they presented their 
proposal, it was being implemented in a rural bank in Sri-Lanka. This solution is also 
implemented over secure SMS and uses random values and PIN numbers as well as 
symmetric key cryptography. Although SMS is also transmitted on GSM’s signaling 
channel, it presents some other characteristics that are unique to this technology, 
like the need to store the messages in a SMS-Center (SMS-C) until being able to 
forward them to the destiny. 
McKitterick and Dowling [9] present a brief resume of some mobile payment 
technologies. Although this document is a study from 2003 and does not cover more 
recent technologies nor the newest trend on smartphones and their capabilities, it 
describes several technologies that are still at use. More interestingly, the authors 
present the case of the Spanish MobyPay, a service that used USSD to process 
financial transactions. This service was associated to credit or debit cards and thus 
was targeted to users with bank accounts. This is not our case, as we do not want to 
impose the need for a user’s bank account association in our solution. 
More recently, Panjwani [12] presented a study on branchless banking systems for 
developing countries, demonstrating that most of the services offered rely largely on 
network-layer services for securing transactions and that they are not end-to-end 
secure. The author a model that builds security at the application layer and provide 
recommendations for solutions based on his model. His proposal is not specific to 
any kind of communication channel and bases security in PIN combined with one-
time passwords and digital signatures. 
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In [13], the authors explore user authentication schemes for m-banking that are 
present in the developing world. They analyze an authentication scheme based on 
PINs and printed codebooks for authenticating users that is used by EKO, an Indian 
mobile banking service provider, and propose an improvement to that scheme that is 
a variant of one-time pad. However, their proposal requires the user to modify his 
PIN (by adding a printed nonce) before a transaction is conducted. Although this 
study is meant to propose a solution for a weaker schemed used by the previously 
referred company, it is interesting in the sense that the result is a one-time user 
signature that is used to authenticate the user to the EKO, and is sent in the clear in 
a USSD message. 
Other literature can be found referring the practical implementations of solutions for 
m-finance, of which M-PESA in Kenya is an example. Most of these implementations 
are based on SMS communications and only provide minimal security, usually via 
PINs. When we researched related work on secure USSD communications, we 
confirmed the diversity of solutions available, but either they do not provide all the 
security properties we are aiming (namely authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation) or they use other access channels, like WAP that provides its own 
security mechanisms. 
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Chapter 3  
Description 
As stated before, in this work we will only address the case where a User interacts 
with an Agent, the representative of the institution that supports the m-Finance 
service and acts on its behalf, like depicted in Figure 2. We make some assumptions 
for this interaction: 
 The Agent is hard-registered to the FTM platform, which means that 
someone at the backoffice introduced into the system all the necessary 
data to validate an Agent. This registration is assumed to be correct and is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
 The User is registered with an Agent he chooses and becomes associated 
with that Agent. After the User is registered to a certain Agent, he cannot 
go to another Agent. One of the reasons to limit the number of Agents to 
one per User is to simply the sending of notification messages in the 
transaction. More details will be provided when message flow is described; 
 The User has no previous knowledge of the Agent, i.e., the User has no 
guarantees that he can trust an Agent he has not previously met or 
acknowledged. This means that the User is not able to tell in the first 
meeting if the Agent is a legitimate certified Agent or someone 
impersonating an Agent. Yet, we will show that the User will have some 
certainty degree after the first meeting with the Agent. This assurance is 
important because the User will have to trust the Agent in order to execute 
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some operations that involve the User’s money. This also means that the 
User does not possess any special information, like certificate keys or 
signature verification keys before meeting an Agent for the first time. 
The User needs to take some steps in order to be registered in the existing PT’s m-
Finance system and to execute some operations on the FTM platform. 
PT Inovação proposed some operations for the normal usage of the m-Finance 
system. Next we describe three of these basic operations, decomposing its steps: 
User registry and activation, User deposit and User withdrawal. These operations 
are already implemented in the FTM platform and our next description does not take 
into account security aspects but only the basic information flow between the 
participants. Our security analysis will be done considering these three basic 
operations. In Chapter 5 we will propose some security modifications to the exiting 
basic operations and in Chapter 8 we will further analyze other security aspects that 
are not covered by the suggested modifications. 
 
3.1 User Registry and Activation 
The actual existing procedure that a User must undergo in order to be registered 
with an Agent is described in the following steps: 
1. Presentation: User physically goes to an Agent and presents personal ID 
documents (ID Card, SSN/NIF, etc) and contacts (mobile phone number, 
email, etc). He shows also his device unique Mobile Subscriber Integrated 
Services Digital Network Number (MSISDN). 
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2. Registration: Agent sends a message to FTM with the User name and 
MSISDN. 
3. Registration Acknowledge: FTM validates message and in case of success 
replies to the Agent: 
User <MSISDN> was successfully registered. 
4. Activation Request: FTM sends message to the User: 
You have been successfully registered with PIN <PIN>. Please 
confirm service activation sending the message “ACT <PIN>” to 
number <LA>. 
5. Activation: User must send the message to the number indicated with the PIN 
he received. 
6. Activation Acknowledge: FTM validates the message and, if successful, 
replies to User: 
Service activation was successful. Current PIN - <PIN>. For 
security reasons, change your PIN as soon as possible. 
Figure 3 depicts this message flow. The dashed line in the Registration step depicts 
a physical interaction, i.e., both parties are physically near each other, in the same 
room. The dotted line in the Activation step represents a text SMS message the User 
sends to the FTM to activate his account. 
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Figure 3 – User Registry and Activation. 1: User goes to the Agent and presents his identification and 
device MSISDN. 2: Agent sends a message to FTM with user ID and MSISDN; 3: FTM confirms User 
registration to Agent; 4: FTM sends User a message confirming his registration and indicating his PIN 
to confirm service registration and activation; 5: User sends a message to FTM confirming his 
registration; 6: FTM confirms User activation. 
 
Note that any User can be registered at only one Agent, and it is the Agent’s 
responsibility to provide the User’s information to the FTM. The FTM is responsible 
for verifying that the message received came from a registered Agent and reject it if 
it does not. With this scheme, the fact that the User has no prior knowledge about 
the Agent’s authenticity is minimized, although not resolved. The User will detect if 
the Agent is correctly registered with the FTM because in case it is not, the User will 
never receive the FTM Activation Request, during step 4. This does not prevent an 
adversary from eavesdropping the Agent’s communications and obtain his MSISDN, 
USER
AGENT FTM
Presentation: U_ID, U_MSISDN
Registration:  U_ID, U_MSISDN
Registration_Ack
Activation_Request: Number, U_PIN
Activation: Number, U_PIN
Activation_Ack: U_PIN
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allowing for the Agent’s impersonation. We will detail this type of attacks in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.2 User Deposit 
A User is able to deposit some money at his m-Finance account. He will deliver the 
money (coins, banknotes, checks or other valid form) to the Agent that informs the 
FTM of the amount received and the User’s identification. The money is then 
converted to the same amount of e-money and credited to the User’s account. The 
Agent will later deliver the money received to the institution that is supporting the m-
Finance service but that procedure is not the scope of this work. The User’s deposit 
transaction involves the following steps: 
1. Presentation: User physically goes to the Agent and hands out the amount of 
money. 
2. Deposit Request: Agent sends a message to the FTM, with the User MSISDN 
and the amount. 
3. Deposit Acknowledge: FTM validates the message and, if correct, replies to 
the Agent: 
The <currency> <amount> was deposited successfully on the client 
<MSISDN> account.  
4. Deposit Information: FTM sends a message to the User: 
<currency> <amount> were deposited in your account. 
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This flow is shown in Figure 4. Again, the dotted line denotes a physical proximity of 
both parties, able to interact with each other. 
 
 
Figure 4 – User Deposit. 1: User goes to the Agent, presents him his MSISDN and the amount of 
money he wants to deposit at his account. 2: Agent receives the amount of money and sends a 
message to the FTM identifying the User and indicating the amount of money to deposit. 3: FTM 
notifies the Agent of the operation’s success. 4: FTM notifies the User that an amount of money was 
deposited in his account. 
 
Again, there are some vulnerabilities in this operation, for instance, it is not protected 
against a mistyping error of the User’s MSISDN. This aspect will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
 
3.3 User Withdrawal 
Withdrawal operations are also possible. The User is able to reconvert the e-money 
at his m-Finance account into day-to-day money (coins and banknotes). The process 
USER
AGENT FTM
Presentation: U_MSISDN, Amount
Deposit_Req: U_MSISDN, Amount
Deposit _Ack: U_MSISDN, Amount
Deposit_Info: Amount
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involves the User withdrawal request to the FTM and, in case that is possible, the 
FTM will issue a virtual voucher with a unique identifier that the User must present at 
his Agent in order to obtain the corresponding amount of money. The virtual voucher 
will identify the User and the amount withdrawn when presented to the Agent. The 
Agent himself has no knowledge of the amount of money, but he will send the 
voucher’s unique identifier to the FTM, and the FTM will verify the voucher’s validity 
and authorize the Agent to handout the money to the User. Notice that once the 
voucher is issued, it means the User has at least that amount in his account. 
Besides, the referred amount will be captivated until the withdrawal operation is 
completed or the voucher’s validity is reached. The withdrawal procedure comprises 
the following steps: 
1. User Withdrawal Request: User sends a message to the FTM, indicating his 
PIN and the amount to withdraw. 
2. Withdrawal Authorization: FTM validates the message and, if successful, 
generates a voucher code, identifying specifically the withdraw of the amount 
requested, and sends a message to the User: 
Your request was successful. To withdraw <currency> <amount> from 
your account go to the Agent and show the code <voucher code>. 
3. Presentation: User goes to the Agent and presents the voucher code. 
4. Agent Withdrawal Request: Agent sends a message to FTM, with his own PIN 
and the voucher code. 
5. Withdrawal Verification: FTM validates the message and, if successful, replies 
to the Agent: 
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Voucher <voucher code> was successfully withdrawn. Deliver 
<currency><amount> to the client. 
6. Withdrawal Information: FTM sends message to the User:  
Agent will deliver you <currency><amount> that were withdrawn from 
your account. 
7. Withdrawal: Agent gives the requested amount to the User. 
This is shown in Figure 5. Again, the dotted lines depict a physical interaction 
between the User and the Agent, where they are near each other. In the first 
physical interaction, the User shows the voucher code to the Agent, while in the last 
case, the Agent hands out the requested amount of money to the User. 
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Figure 5 – User Withdrawal. 1: User sends to FTM a message requesting the withdrawal of a certain 
amount and indicating his PIN. 2: FTM validates the User and verifies if withdrawal is possible. In 
case so, FTM sends a virtual voucher code to the User. 3: User goes physically to the Agent’s and 
shows him the voucher, requesting the money. 4: Agent sends the voucher to the FTM along with his 
own PIN. 5: FTM verifies the Agent’s PIN and confirms the validity of the voucher. FTM sends a 
message to the Agent authorizing him to deliver the amount associated to the voucher code to the 
User. 6: The FTM sends a message to the User informing him of the withdrawal authorization from his 
account. 7: Agent hands out the amount of money to the User. 
 
Again, there are some vulnerabilities in this procedure that will be discussed in 
Chapter 8, namely, disputes between the Agent and the User. 
  
USER
AGENT FTM
User_Withdrwl_Req: Amount, U_PIN
Withdrwl_Auth: Amount, Voucher
Presentation: Voucher
Agent_Withdrwl_Req: Voucher, A_PIN
Withdrwl_Verif: Amount
Withdrwl_Info: Amount
Withdrwl: Amount
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Chapter 4  
Threat Model 
In this chapter we will analyze the threat model. As we are proposing a protocol 
similar to SSL/TLS, but using a USSD channel, we need to analyze the USSD threat 
model. 
There are several studies already on USSD communications. As stated before, 
because USSD is a GSM service and transfer of information occurs over signaling 
GSM channels, security characteristics for USSD are narrowly tied with GSM 
security. In [11], the authors present a thorough analysis of GSM vulnerabilities, as 
well as their proposed solutions for them. They refer to unilateral authentication and 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks, SIM card cloning, flaws in the GSM algorithms used, 
vulnerability to DoS attacks, the absence of integrity protection and vulnerabilities to 
replay attacks, among others. USSD is also mentioned because messages are not 
encrypted and secured in the GSM backbone. Their solutions range from secure 
algorithm implementations and secure ciphering algorithms, encryption of the GSM 
backbone traffic and end-to-end security. They describe some possible means of 
implementing this end-to-end security, pointing that most of them will require 
improved device processing capabilities. 
Sarajlic and Omerasevic [5] present a study of some available m-Commerce access 
channels, including USSD. As they noted, while GSM intends to provide user 
authentication and encryption of communication in the radio interface, this does not 
apply to the signaling channels, and USSD is transmitted unencrypted. Besides, 
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attacks to GSM encrypted communications have been made, as was demonstrated 
by Barkan, Biham and Keller in [7], so we cannot rely on GSM’s security properties. 
Panjwani [12] presents some vulnerabilities of m-finance protocols for branchless 
banking systems. He identifies internal system vulnerabilities, addressing the 
possibility of insider attacks to the m-finance protocols. These insider attacks need to 
be mitigated as well as GSM vulnerabilities and the author considers external threats 
as well as internal threats to the protocol. 
We present here a USSD threat model according to our system architecture and 
communications model. We make some assumptions and impose some 
requirements in our system, listed below: 
1. We assume that the Agent has a mobile device with increased computational 
and processing capabilities. This is needed if we want to assure that the 
Agent is able to encrypt/decrypt all communication with the FTM. 
2. We impose that the Agent is to be certified by the FTM so that we can be sure 
the Agent in not being impersonated and, at the same time, have non-
repudiation properties. However, we propose that this certification is done out-
of-band, in a multi-path security confirmation, not requiring a Certification 
Authority or a standard public/private key pair. In fact, we will not use a public 
key to certify the Agent to the FTM. With a certified Agent we can be assured 
that the FTM is not communicating with an impersonation version, and we can 
call him responsible for the transactions. We will use temporary keys to attest 
that we are dealing with the correct Agent. 
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3. We require that the communication between the Agent and the FTM must be 
encrypted. This requirement provides end-to-end encryption between the 
Agent and the FTM. 
We identified five possible sources of vulnerabilities: mobile device attacks, network 
attacks, cryptographic and protocol attacks, operator attacks and social engineering 
attacks. We will describe in the next sections. 
 
4.1 Mobile Device Attacks 
Mobile devices present some vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored for the 
application we intend. The vulnerabilities list includes: 
 Device stolen or lost. This is a very common situation. Devices are very small 
and portable, so it will be easy for someone to misplace it. Besides, modern 
devices are expensive and may be used as a status symbol, so they will 
attract thieves will a high probability. The case of the User’s lost or stolen 
device may be critical if another person is able to access the device history list 
of previously dialed numbers. If the USSD messages are sent in a full format, 
i.e., the user includes all the needed information in the message sent, then it 
is possible to retrieve sensitive information out of the history list, most 
especially in the case of the withdrawal operation, where the User needs to 
send his PIN. The Agent’s lost or stolen device is also very critical because 
the FTM only accepts Agent commands from registered Agents, and detects 
them through their MSISDN. The whole Agent – FTM communication is 
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currently only based on the Agent’s correct MSISDN and no further Agent 
validation is required. 
 Presence of malicious applications. Modern mobile devices present a high 
degree of customization, where users can decide what type of applications 
they want to install in their device. This presents some problems due to the 
higher possibility of installing malicious software, able to collect sensitive 
information from the device, or take control of it by making calls and or 
sending messages without the user’s knowledge. The malicious application 
may be able to read all the previous USSD communications with the FTM 
system and replay the messages or impersonate the User or the Agent.  
 Backdoor access to the device. This is somewhat related to the previous. A 
malicious application that intends to collect sensitive information most 
certainly will try to access communication ports out of the owner’s knowledge, 
in order to transmit that information. On the other hand, other ports may be 
used to access and control the device even if there is not any kind of 
malicious application installed. This may happen, for example, if the user uses 
other wireless channels, like Bluetooth or WiFi, not properly protected. An 
attacker may access the device through those unprotected channels and take 
control of it. 
 Malicious user. The owner of the device may try to tamper the protocol or the 
application. This is another type of vulnerability, where the owner of the 
device is not trustable. The User or the Agent may try to modify the messages 
transmitted in order to profit from it. 
 SIM card cloning. If the system stores sensitive information in the SIM card 
and an attacker is able to access that information, we may end with duplicated 
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Agents or Users in the system. We will see that this will not happen in our 
proposal because sensitive information is never stored in the Agent’s or 
User’s devices. Although no sensitive information is stored, the Agent’s device 
SIM card or memory must be protected as it will be were the Agent application 
is installed and the adversary may try to change or modify it in order to 
decrease its security level. 
 
4.2 Network Attacks 
Attacks to the network are also possible and not very difficult, as mentioned by Paik 
[4]. Some of the attacks are described below. 
 Network operator impersonation. As described in [4], an attacker is able to 
impersonate the network operator, leading a valid user to think he is using a 
legitimate operator, but instead his conversations and data are being 
eavesdropped. In the worse case, the adversary may conduct a Men-in-the-
Middle attack, by altering the contents of the data being transmitted both 
sides. 
 FTM impersonation. An attacker may also be able to impersonate the FTM 
where he can alter the amounts he receives from the User, or the values he 
has to deliver in. For example, when the User wants to withdraw some 
money, the attacker impersonating the FTM may act towards the User and the 
Agent as a legitimate FTM, but internally divert part of the User’s credit to his 
own account. This is possible because it is the FTM’s responsibility to 
synchronize the Users accounts at the m-Finance system and the banks, 
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merchants, IN systems or others. The attacker might conduct a major attack, 
where he is able to get a large amount of money from this attack, or might opt 
to conduct a low profile attack, where he diverts small amounts that may be 
unnoticed for a long period of time and only be detected when the User 
complains about the balance difference. 
 Agent impersonation. The attacker may also try to impersonate an Agent. One 
possible way to do so is through Agent’s MSISDN spoofing. Currently, the 
Agent is identified to the FTM by his MSISDN, but an adversary my start by 
eavesdrop the communications, collect important and sensitive information 
about the Agent, and then spoof his MSISDN. 
 Malicious Agent. n this case a malicious Agent will be easily detected. This 
will happen because the FTM will always acknowledge the values of the 
transaction being processed with the User directly. If the attacker is trying to 
deceive the User, making him believe that he is depositing a higher amount of 
money, but instead the dishonest Agent is getting some of it to himself, the 
FTM will acknowledge the User about the exact amount that was deposited, 
as is shown in 3.2, during step 4. If the malicious Agent is trying to deceive 
the User during withdrawal, the User will also detect it because the FTM’s 
voucher will identify the amount of money to withdraw from the User’s 
account, and the User will receive a message informing him of that amount, 
as can be seen at 3.3, in step 6. 
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4.3 Cryptography and Protocols Attacks 
Cryptography and protocol attacks are also possible, like for example: 
 Replay attacks. If the messages exchanged are not properly protected by 
timestamps, random values or nonces, an eavesdropper may collect the 
information being transmitted and replay it to the system. 
 MSISDN spoofing. Part of the protocol is supported in the User being 
identified by the Agent and the FTM platform by its MSISDN. Yet, this number 
can be spoofed and an adversary eavesdropping the communication between 
the User and the FTM, for instance, can read his PIN and spoof his MSISDN, 
thus impersonating the User to the FTM system. This will allow the adversary 
to start financial transactions on behalf of the User. 
 Man-in-the-Middle attacks. As stated before, USSD messages are sent in 
plain text, so a Man-in-the-Middle attack is possible, where the adversary 
intercepts and modifies the USSD communications between the User and the 
FTM system. Such an attack was described in [4]. 
 Colluding attacks. We showed before that a dishonest Agent will be detected 
by the User, but if this attack is combined with a Man-in-the-Middle attack, 
intercepting and modifying the messages sent between the User and the 
FTM, then the malicious Agent attack is more certain to succeed when the 
User tries to deposit money. The malicious Agent must be able to send 
erroneous information about the amount to deposit, and at the same time a 
Man-in-the-Middle attack should be perform in order to intercept and modify 
the message sent by the FTM to the User. This way, the User will not be able 
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to detect that the FTM system received less money than what he really 
handed out to the Agent. 
 Cryptographic attacks. Sensitive and critical information should be encrypted, 
but if we use weak cryptographic algorithms, the users may get a false feeling 
of security and while their information is vulnerable and may be tampered 
with. This may lead to fraudulent financial transactions, amongst other 
problems. 
 
4.4 Operator Attacks 
Operator attacks generally configure DoS attacks because the participants (Users, 
Agent and FTM) are not able to complete the transactions. Depending on the state of 
the transaction completion, this may be disruptive to the system. For example, the 
user commands a withdrawal operation but never receives the voucher from the 
FTM system. He may be tempted to try again a withdrawal transaction, and so on, 
until his funds are not enough. Although the money never really leaves his account 
until he presents the voucher to the Agent, this may cause perturbations to the 
service. The attacks may include: 
 Message sending or receiving loss. The operator is not able to deliver the 
USSD messages due to attacks to the GSM infrastructure, for example. 
 Message corruption. An adversary is able to corrupt part of the USSD 
messages sent, and prevent financial transactions from being completed, or 
the User’s registration to an Agent. 
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 Message delay. An attacker is able to introduce delays in the message flow. 
Because of USSD characteristics, mainly session oriented and expiration 
time, message delay may cause transactions to abort due to timeout. 
 Message flood. Another possible attack is to initiate many USSD sessions 
until the operator or the FTM system is no longer able to process them. 
 Message tamper. And attacker can tamper with USSD plain text 
communications, but with the FTM finance model he would have to do that 
both between the Agent-FTM and User-FTM communications at the same 
time and he would also have to ensure that that the USSD communications 
he is attacking would not timed-out. Although difficult to conduct, this attack is 
possible and we will try to solve it with our proposal. 
 
4.5 Social Engineering Attacks 
Social engineering attacks are also possible. Deceiving the User or the Agent in 
such a way that he gives away critical information without noticing, and performing 
this attack without needing much knowledge on technology, but rather on psychology 
makes this kind of attacks very effective, so we have to consider them. These may 
include: 
 Phishing. The attacker sends messages to the victim leading him to disclose 
sensitive information. For instance, the attacker sends a fake message asking 
the victim to send a response message to a certain number (the attacker’s) 
with the victim’s PIN. The message does not need to be similar to the ones 
sent by the FTM. It only have to be convincing. This is particularly important 
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because the User does receive such a message to activate his system 
registration, so an attacker will only have to be near and observe when 
someone is being registered, get his MSISDN, which includes the User’s 
mobile phone number, and send the fake message in the right moment. The 
User will then respond to the fake message with his PIN, and after that, the 
attacker either stills the User’s device, or impersonates the User through 
MSISDN spoofing. Another possible phishing attack can be executed when 
the attacker sends a message to the victim stating, for example, “We have 
problems with your account, please send your PIN to number <xxx> to 
validate your account”. Again, the following step will be MSISDN spoofing or 
device stealing. 
 Shoulder Surfing. In this case, the attacker will be observing the victim, User 
or Agent, in order to obtain important information, like the PIN. Latter, we will 
be able to use that information for his profit in colluding with another attack, 
like MSISDN spoofing (that will allow for Agent or User impersonation) or 
simply by stealing the victim’s device. 
 
4.6 Attack Mitigation 
Mitigation of all the attacks described may not be possible. The security level that we 
can achieve highly depends on the devices processing capabilities and it is not 
possible to impose to every Agent or User of the FTM platform to purchase a mobile 
phone device with better security requirements. Some of the targets of this type of 
service are users without bank accounts and we must assume that not everyone will 
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possess a secure device. Because in our proposal we focus on the Agent – FTM 
secure communications, mainly because the Agent is a person responsible for 
receiving and delivering money to the Users, and hence subject to be tempted, we 
impose that the Agent’s device must have minimum processing characteristics in 
order to be able to encrypt, decrypt and compute MACs for the USSD messages. 
Even if we assume that all mobile devices have processing advanced capabilities, 
the underlying network is still vulnerable to attacks: USSD service may be 
unavailable due to a DoS attack, or the operator’s GSM network may be attacked. 
These attacks may not aim the FTM service, but it will be affected anyway, because 
is it based on the mobile network infrastructure. 
Replay Attacks. To prevent from replay attacks, transactions should include a 
random or a nonce, but this requires that the mobile device is able to produce 
random values, or that the mobile owner has the means to use a nonce generator of 
some sort. 
Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Multi-path and out-of-band confirmations are also 
viable solutions to prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks as well as replay attacks. 
These can take the form of an extra pass-code or a code from a code matrix only 
known to the participants and never stored or computed by the device. This solution 
is also advantageous for User’s devices with low processing capabilities. Although 
an eavesdropper can listen to the communications, if the codes are modified 
periodically, or ideally, never repeated, there is little direct advantage to this. If we 
use a matrix code, the FTM platform can keep track of the codes already used and 
not ask for them again. When all the codes are exhausted, the FTM system could 
send a message to User, asking him to renew his matrix codes at an Agent’s, or to 
40 
 
the Agent asking him to go to the operator’s facilities in order to obtain a new set of 
codes. This implementation can easily be done from the FTM platform side and 
although the communication between the User and the FTM system should be 
protected, the use of nonces from a matrix code card will be an inexpensive 
implementation to prevent this type of attack, even if encryption is not possible. 
Challenge, Puzzles, Secret-Code Confirmations. The FTM platform can also 
implement an extra security measure of asking for another type of secure 
confirmation if the cumulative value of the transactions exceeds a certain value, or 
the number of transactions is higher than a certain threshold. This extra security 
measure should be implemented both at the User and the Agent. 
Incomplete Transactions. The problem of incomplete transactions either due to 
unintentional or malicious network service disruption (which may be classified as 
DoS), or to the User’s responsibility, for instance, not enough battery or out-of-cover 
zone, must be solved at the FTM side. A timed-out USSD session must conduct the 
FTM service to abort the transaction and the FTM should guarantee transactions 
atomicity, i.e., either every step described is executed correctly or all steps fail and 
the account status should rollback to the beginning of the failed transaction. The 
User will need to start a new transaction if this happens. This is not the scope of this 
work and we will not address this any further. 
FTM’s Resource Exhaustion. It is possible to implement measures that prevent 
DoS attacks due to the FTM’s resource exhaustion. One possible solution is that for 
every time the FTM receives a message, it will reply with a challenge that the User 
needs to answer in order to continue. The challenge may be as simple as asking the 
value for a random arithmetic operation, but the USSD session will terminate if the 
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answer is not sent, or if it is wrong. This will have the advantage of requiring human 
interaction and hence prevent automatic attacks to the FTM service. We have not 
considered an implementation in our security proposal. Although it is a simple 
solution, it adds more steps to the transaction and the impact on performance needs 
to be evaluated. 
User’s Communication Security. We classified the User’s devices into three 
categories, according to their processing capabilities: 
 Category 1: Legacy devices: devices are not able to execute cryptographic 
functions due to their limited processing capabilities. We also include in this 
group those devices that do not support SIM applications; 
 Category 2: Medium capable devices: in this category we include devices that 
have some processing capabilities and that allow for SIM application install 
 Category 3: Top devices: in this category we included smartphones and 
similar devices. They allow for custom application installations and they 
provide some type of TCB components. 
The level of User communications security will depend on the device category he 
owns. Medium capable devices will allow for the use of STK to develop secure 
USSD applications. Besides, it will also allow the operator to perform application 
OTA updates. 
If the User loses his device or changes it, his account that is associated with the 
previous device MSISDN will need to be re-associated to the new device. This 
procedure will not be addressed in this work. If the User’s device is stolen, then an 
adversary may have access to sensitive information kept in the phone so we do not 
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propose a solution supported in secret keys stored in the User’s device, 
independently of the device’s category. Instead, we propose a multi-path, out-of-
band transaction confirmation, for instance, based on a code matrix personal card 
that will prevent a robber from using any kind of secret information stored inside the 
device, unless he also gets the card. 
User Confidentiality. One problem that is not completely resolved in our proposal is 
transaction confidentiality. This is especially true on the User’s side, mostly because 
in order to protect User’s communications we need to be able to encrypt and decrypt 
what is being sent, which is not possible for category 1 devices. For other categories, 
a STK application may be used to execute this extra security measure, but it will 
require that the User shares a set of secret keys with the FTM system. In this 
proposal we considered only the Agent-FTM communications protection, which is 
encrypted, but the same mechanism can be extended to the User-FTM 
communication depending on his device category. In spite of this, User-FTM 
confidentiality should be considered for User safety. An attacker may be able to 
eavesdrop the USSD communications channel to know when the User carries 
money with him, and conduct a physical attack to rob the money. 
Encryption. From the network side, USSD communications will be secured when 
encrypted with short term secret keys. As referred before, this is not completely 
possible for User’s devices of category 1, but we assume that the Agent’s device is 
of a higher category, and hence will allow for the generation of session keys, as we 
propose in the next chapter. If it is not possible to encrypt communications, then a 
certain level of security may be achieved through challenges or multi-path 
confirmations. In our proposal we use multi-path confirmations based on secrets that 
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only the FTM and the player (the Agent or the User) know about, like a pass code or 
a coordinate from a code matrix. To increase the level of security, the system must 
force the Agent or User to change the codes periodically, or after a certain number of 
utilizations. Even if the codes have to be transmitted in the clear, like for category 1 
devices, this will make things more difficult for an attacker. 
Short-Term Secret Keys. From the Agent’s side, our proposal will encrypt all 
communications between the Agent and the FTM. The secret keys are only valid for 
a limited period of time (ideally, the keys will be valid only for the transaction 
duration, but if the performance is affected by the secret key generation it is possible 
to extend their validity), and they can only be generated if the Agent answers a 
challenge only he knows about. This will prevent an attacker from using the Agent’s 
device, or from impersonating the Agent in any other way (for example, by spoofing 
the Agent’s MSISDN) to generate valid session keys and access the system. 
Malicious Agent. As we have referred before, if an Agent is malicious and wants to 
cheat on the User in order to get his money, we will need to conduct a more complex 
attack, because the FTM will send the User a confirmation for each transaction made 
in his account. So the malicious Agent will have to execute a Man-in-the-Middle 
attack to prevent the User from getting that confirmation. Of course, a Man-in-the-
Middle attack would be impossible if the communication with the User is conveniently 
encrypted. This would require that the FTM and the User share a secret key or that 
the User has a set of public/private keys. Either way, the secret/private key needs to 
be stored at the User’s device, which is something that may easily get lost or stolen, 
so the same observations on the about a solution based on storing secret keys in the 
device are valid here, and a more appropriate solution would be to have a similar 
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out-of-band multi-path confirmations. Besides, as we referred before, this is not 
possible to implement with category 1 devices.  
Social Engineering Attacks. Attacks where the User or Agent is lead to disclose 
sensitive information by his own will are more difficult to prevent. One solution may 
be to use a kind of service watermark or seal of origin. The USSD service installed in 
the device would show a special icon, or mark. Any message sent by the FTM would 
have to display the same mark. This can be as small as an icon, but its absence 
would alert the user to an imposter FTM message. This solution will probably not be 
suitable for all devices categories, but if implemented would train device owners to 
search for signs of authenticity in received messages and discard the ones that do 
not present that graphic authenticity mark. For consistency, this should be 
implemented both at User and Agent side. 
PIN Guessing Attacks. PINs are usually very short, and users tend to keep them for 
long, increasing the probability of a successful PIN guessing attack. The FTM should 
implement at the User and Agent side a mechanism that allows for only a number of 
consecutive wrong PIN value insertions, and lock the Agent or User account if that 
value is exceeded. This would prevent from PIN guessing attacks. Also, to increase 
the system overall security, both User and Agent PINs should have a validity 
associated and the FTM system should force the PIN to be changed when that 
validity is about to expire. When that happens, the service would send a message to 
the User or Agent for them to change their PIN and preventing them from using the 
rest of the services until that happens. 
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Chapter 5  
Protocol 
Next, we propose and describe a protocol we devised to mitigate some of the attacks 
referred. This protocol is based on SSL/TLS, but was modified in order to fit the 
USSD limited structure. The modifications will be kept to a minimum, in order to 
maintain the best possible correspondence to the SSL/TLS standard. 
As referred before, the maximum size of a USSD message is 182 bytes and it 
presents a special format, depicted in the following Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6 – FTM USSD message general format. FTM service identification, FTM service data and 
end-of-message indicator 
 
In this figure, we assume that the <FTM service> is the USSD service number 
identifying the FTM application and that this application identifier value can range 
from 1 to 9999. Hence, its length can go from 2 to 5 bytes.  
As stated previously, the USSD message starts with a *, is followed by the USSD 
application value and terminates with a #. Any additional parameters are placed after 
the USSD application identifier and start with a *. 
*<FTM service> *<FTM Service Data> #
2 to 5 bytes n bytes 1 byte
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The FTM Service Data is where we will send information with respect to the FTM 
service, and we will try to include in this field our SSL/TLS-based security protocol. 
USSD does not handle multiple packets by itself. This should be done at the 
application layer, in case we need to send a message bigger than 182 characters. In 
order to guarantee the correct reception of a message greater than the maximum 
allowable size of the USSD message, the application must support out-of-order 
delivery and loss of messages. This implies that both the service application in the 
FTM and in the devices must be capable of temporarily storage messages, keep 
track of their order delivery and ask for message retransmission in case of message 
loss. Although possible, it would increase the delivery time and the processing time 
of a full message as well as storage space. We are not aiming for this message 
scheme. Instead, we will analyze SSL/TLS handshake message exchange and fit 
them to the USSD message size.  
Keeping the messages within the limit of 182 characters has two advantages: the 
service is much simpler to implement in both sides (FTM, and device) because we 
do not need to deal with multi-packet messages, and the problems referred before, 
and the number of USSD messages exchanged will be kept to a minimum instead of 
varying with the size of the messages. 
Another aspect that needs to be taken into account is that USSD does not guarantee 
message delivery. This means that the USSD service application at the FTM and the 
User and Agent devices must be capable of detecting incomplete transactions and 
USSD timed out sessions, and proceed accordingly to manage USSD sessions and 
keep data coherence. 
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5.1 Agent Session Registry at the FTM Platform 
In order to guarantee secure communications between the Agent and the FTM, we 
propose a session authentication based on the following: 
1 –  The FTM platform has a set of public/private keys. 
2 –  The Agent has a prior knowledge of the FTM public key. This information 
can be given to the Agent upon his registry to the FTM platform which, by the 
time being, is done manually through the backoffice. Each Agent should be 
registered at the operator physical site, or other physical agency, by 
presenting the mobile device as well as other information and/or certificates 
that will be used later to prove the Agent is a legitimate one. This physical 
registry step will also provide the Agent with a secret code, or set of secret 
codes (eg., a PIN number, a password, or a code matrix) that will be used 
later to register the Agent’s session. Each Agent will have his own secret code 
and this secret code will be registered by the FTM platform. 
3 –  The Agent initiates an USSL/UTLS session with the FTM. 
 
First Phase – USSL/UTLS authentication: 
Similar to SSL/TLS, the handshake is processed as following: 
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# Direction Message Contents 
1 Agent  FTM client hello Protocol version 
Agent’s random 
List of Cipher Suites 
2 FTM  Agent server hello Protocol version 
FTM’s random 
Session ID 
Chosen Cipher Suite 
3 FTM  Agent  certificate FTM Certificate 
4 FTM  Agent server hello done Signature on hash (Agent 
random || FTM random, data) 
5 Agent  FTM client key exchange  Agent public DH value 
6 Agent  FTM change cipher spec  
7 Agent  FTM Finish Handshake message 
8 FTM  Agent change cipher spec  
9 FTM  Agent Finish Handshake message 
Table 1 – USSL/UTLS authentication handshake exchange. The format follows the standard SSL/TLS 
handshake protocol very closely 
 
This is essentially the SSL/TLS handshake protocol, transmitted on top of USSD as 
a transport layer. We will show below the adaptations we propose in order for the 
SSL/TLS packets to fit in our FTM service data, as depict in Figure 6. 
After this, the Agent and the FTM platform share a Master Secret and have 
authenticated each other. This Master Secret should be used to generate Session 
Keys for each session started, but should never be transmitted over-the-air (OTA). 
As state before, we do not want to deal with multi-packet USSD transmission, so we 
will study SSL/TLS packets contents and adjust them whenever necessary to fit into 
our USSD FTM service data field. 
The SSL record has the following general format that is encapsulated in a TCP 
message: 
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Figure 7 – SSL/TLS handshake message record 
 
The SSL Record Header has the following format: 
 
 
Figure 8 – SSL Record Header format 
 
Here, the Record Type will have two possible values: 
 20  – Change_Cipher_Spec, where the protocol signals that it switches to the 
last negotiated cipher suite 
 22 – Handshake, for Hello and other connection-initiation messages 
Major Version and Minor Version will be set to 3 and 1 respectively, to comply with 
the TLS standard. The Message Length gives the length in bytes of the Handshake 
Header and Handshake Data, but do not include the HMAC and padding sizes. 
The Handshake Header filed is simply comprised of the Handshake Type and the 
Message Length, respectively, 1 byte and 3 bytes. Again, this does not include the 
HMAC field or the padding field. 
SSL Record
Header
Handshake
Header
Handshake Data HMAC padding
5 bytes 4 bytes n bytes 16 or 20 bytes (if a block
cipher is used)
handshake message
Type
1 byte 3 bytes
Major 
Version
Minor
Version
Message Length
1 byte 1 byte
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For our USSD version of the protocol we will not need to include the padding field, 
but the HMAC will have to be considered. So, we will have to account for the SSL 
Record Header, the Handshake Header, the Handshake Date and the HMAC, which 
will lead to 29+n bytes. Below we will see the value of this variable part for each 
handshake message. 
General SSL/TLS messages are very irregular in format, so next we will describe the 
account for each SSL/TLS handshake, header and message. This will allow us to 
compute the number of bytes of each message exchanged, and clearly check if each 
SSL/TLS message fits in a USSD message or if we need to limit, and thus simplify, 
the information exchanged.  
We will include in our USSD version the SSL Record Header, the Handshake 
Header, the Handshake Data and the HMAC fields. Note that we don’t really need to 
use 3 bytes for the Message Length, in the SSL Record Header or in the Handshake 
Header. The USSD message string can have a maximum of 182 bytes, and this 
value will fit in 2 bytes. This will allow us to save 2 bytes for data, if needed. This is 
not reflected on the next tables, where we opted to describe the messages as close 
as possible to the SSL/TLS standard. 
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 Client_Hello: 
 
Field Size and description 
Handshake type:  
 1 – CLIENT_HELLO 
1 byte 
Message Length 3 bytes 
Handshake data <Message length> bytes 
- Major version: 1 byte (set to 3) 
- Minor version: 1 byte (set to 1) 
- Random data: 32 bytes 
- Session Id length: 1 byte 
- Session Id: 0-32 bytes (used to resume a 
previous session, sidestepping the key-
generation phase. Client usually indicates 0) 
- Cipher suite length: 2 bytes 
- Cipher suite list: 2-216 – 1 bytes (represented 
by a 2-byte number and sorted in preference 
order. Server may choose any suite in the 
clients list) 
- Compression list length: 1 byte 
- Compression list: 1-255 bytes (usually is 0, 
representing null) 
Table 2 – Client_Hello handshake message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The maximum size of handshake data is 65860 bytes. 
The length of the Client_Hello message highly depends on the cipher spec 
list. This is limited to what the device API can offer. If the Agent is only able to 
support a maximum a 2 cipher suites, the size of the handshake data is highly 
reduced to 43 bytes. This is suitable for our USSD version, so we limit the 
number of cipher suites to only two possible cipher suites. 
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 Server_Hello: 
 
Field Size and description 
Handshake type:  
 2 – SERVER_HELLO 
1 byte 
Message Length 3 bytes 
Handshake data - Major version: 1 byte (set to 3) 
- Minor version: 1 byte (set to 1) 
- Random data: 32 bytes 
- Session Id length: 1 byte 
- Session Id: 0-32 bytes (used to resume a 
previous session, sidestepping the key-
generation phase. Server specifies a session 
id) 
- Cipher suite: 2 bytes (2-byte number of the 
suite chosen by the server) 
- Compression method: 1 byte (usually is 0, 
representing null) 
Table 3 – Server_Hello handshake message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The size of handshake data is 70 bytes. 
 
 Certificate: 
 
Field Size and description 
Handshake type:  
 3 – CERTIFICATE 
1 byte 
Message Length 3 bytes 
Handshake data - Certificate list length: 3 bytes 
- Certificate list: 1-224 – 1 bytes 
Table 4 – Server_Certificate handshake message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The maximum size of handshake data for the SSL/TLS protocol is 16777218 
bytes. 
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The certificate list is usually a chain of certificates, with the first being the 
server’s own certificate, followed by any authenticating certificates from CAs. 
In this case, each CA signs the server’s certificate with its private key. The 
CA’s certificate contains the CA’s public key, which the client uses to verify 
that the CA was, in fact, the signer of the server’s certificate. The client 
typically has its own copy of the CA’s certificate, making the transaction 
secure. Depending on the size of the server’s certificate, this size can be 
greatly reduced. 
 
 Server_Hello_Done:  
 
Field Size and description 
Handshake type:  
 14 – SERVER_HELLO_DONE 
1 byte 
Message Length 3 bytes (set to 0) 
Table 5 – Server_Hello_Done handshake message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
There is no handshake data, so its size is 0 bytes. 
This message is used to tell the client that the server has finished its hello 
sequence and that the client may begin the key-transfer process. 
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 Client_Key_Exchange: 
For RSA for the key exchange we have the following values:  
 
Field Size and description 
Handshake type:  
 16 – CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 
1 byte 
Message Length 3 bytes (the value is 128 due to RSA 
encryption) 
Handshake data - Major version: 1 byte (set to 3) 
- Minor version: 1 byte (set to 1) 
- Random data: 46 bytes 
(cryptographically secured, i.e., 
generated by a cryptographically 
strong pseudorandom generator) 
Table 6 – Client_Key_Exchange handshake message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The size of handshake data is 128 bytes due to RSA encryption. 
The message contains a pre-master secret encrypted with the FTM’s public 
key that was in its certificates. The minor and major version fields are 
encrypted along with the random data. Notice that if we account for the HMAC 
of 20 bytes, as well as for the SSL Header of 5 bytes, this message will be 
157 bytes long. Adding the USSD delimiters and FTM application identifier will 
produce a USSD message with 164 bytes. It still fits the USSD size 
constraints. 
After this message, both the Agent and the FTM platform can generate keys 
for the rest of the session. 
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 Change_Chiper_Spec: 
 
Field Size and description 
Record type:  
 20 – CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 
1 byte 
Data Field 1 byte (set to 1) 
Table 7 – Change_Cipher_Spec message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The Change_Cipher_Spec is not a handshake message but rather a SSL 
record type that indicates a switch to the last negotiated cipher suite. In this 
case, we do not need to compute the 4 bytes for the Handshake Header, and 
so the size of this message is 1 byte (the size of the Data Field). 
 
 Finish: 
 
Field Size and description 
Handshake type:  
 20 – FINISH 
1 byte 
Message Length 3 bytes (value is 36) 
Handshake data - MD5 hash: 16 bytes 
- SHA1 hash: 20 bytes 
Table 8 – Finish handshake message. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The size of handshake data is 36 bytes.  
The Finish message is encrypted and the hashes are computed over all the 
previous handshake messages, verifying that the unauthenticated messages 
were not tampered with.  
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At the end of the USSL/UTLS authentication phase, both the FTM and the Agent will 
have a set of session keys that can be used to protect and encrypt the 
communications that follow. The session keys are obtained through the master key 
they agreed upon and for which both contributed. The inputs for the master key are 
the Agent and FTM random values and the pre-master secret sent in the 
Client_Hello, Server_Hello and Client_Key_Exchange messages. The details of the 
generation of the session keys from the master key depend on the protocol being 
used. The Agent and the FTM now will independently produce a set of session keys, 
to be used in the next communications. The method is slightly different for TLS and 
for SSL, but the end result will be 
 Agent write MAC secret: MACAgent 
 FTM write MAC secret: MACFTM 
 Agent write key: KeyAgent 
 FTM write key: KeyFTM 
 Agent write IV 
 FTM write IV 
The Agent and FTM MAC keys, MACAgent and MACFTM, are used to guarantee the 
integrity of the messages sent by each other, while the Agent and FTM write keys, 
KeyAgent and KeyFTM, are used to encrypt the messages sent. 
 
Second Phase – Agent authentication: 
During the second phase, the FTM platform asks the Agent to introduce a secret 
personal code, in order to confirm its identification. This secret code was given to the 
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Agent upon his physical registration to the FTM platform, as described before, and 
can take several forms: a PIN number, a password or a specific code from a code 
matrix only the Agent and the FTM platform knows about. Whatever aspect the 
secret code takes, it should not be saved in the Agent device and it will not be 
transmitted to the FTM. Instead, the Agent will answer with a hash of the secret and 
the FTM will compare the received hash with its own hash of the correct code. This 
will constitute and out-of-band verification, and will allow the FTM platform to verify 
that the Agent is a legitimate one, as only the legitimate Agent is able to correctly 
reply to the FTM request. 
During this phase, replay attacks can be prevented if the USSD message includes a 
protection mechanism, like a random value, a nonce, or a timestamp. Assuming that 
a random value is used, the messages exchanged would be like the following: 
 
# Direction Message Contents 
1 FTM  Agent  Agent code 
request 
FTM’s random (32 bytes) 
secret details (2 bytes) 
2 Agent  FTM Agent code  FTM’s random (32 bytes) 
Agent’s random (32 bytes) 
hash of secret (32 bytes) 
Table 9 – Agent Authentication exchange. Message field listing and byte account. 
 
The message sent by the FTM to the Agent will be encrypted with the KeyAgent 
session Agent key computed before, and will concatenate with a MAC computed 
with the MACAgent session MAC key. We propose the size of 32 bytes for the MAC 
field, but this size can be reduced to 16 bytes to meet performance requirements, if 
necessary.  
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The hash of the secret can be computed in two different ways, which will impact 
slightly on the performance and security of the protocol. Either we use a standard 
MD5 or SHA-1 HMAC of 16 or 20 bytes respectively, in which case the FTM does 
not need to store the Agents secret code but only the hashes of the value, or we use 
the MACAgent session MAC key to compute a hash that is different for every session. 
In this case, the FTM will need to store the real Agent secret code in order to verify 
the correctness of the hash value he received from the Agent, which will impact on 
performance on the FTM side. On the other hand, this solution prevents replay 
attacks because even if the secret code maintained for a long time, the MACAgent key 
will be different for each USSL/UTLS session and an attacker will not be able to 
perform a replay attack. 
This step can be modified to include a protection agains social engineering attacks, 
as referred in 4.5 and 4.6. If the mitigation is to be implemented, the first step should 
be modified. The FTM would send the Agent a number of extra bytes in the Agent 
code request that would display in the Agent’s device as a special mark or seal of 
origin, graphically identifying the FTM service to the Agent. If the device is not 
capable of displaying such mark, either would not display any mark at all or present 
a message stating that the sender is the correct one. This measure would not 
increase the number of messages exchanged, but would add a few more bytes to 
the first message and some processing in the Agent’s device, but it would help 
avoiding the social engineering attacks. 
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5.2 User Registry and Activation 
Recalling the User registry and activation described in 3.1: 
1. Presentation: User physically goes to an Agent and presents personal ID 
documents (ID Card, SSN/NIF, etc) and contacts (mobile phone number, 
email, etc). He shows also his device unique Mobile Subscriber Integrated 
Services Digital Network Number (MSISDN). 
2. Registration: Agent sends a message to FTM with the User name and 
MSISDN. 
3. Registration Acknowledge: FTM validates message and in case of success 
replies to the Agent: 
User <MSISDN> was successfully registered. 
4. Activation Request: FTM sends message to the User: 
You have been successfully registered with PIN <PIN>. Please 
confirm service activation sending the message “ACT <PIN>” to 
number <LA>. 
5. Activation: User must send the message to the number indicated with the PIN 
he received. 
6. Activation Acknowledge: FTM validates the message and, if successful, 
replies to User: 
Service activation was successful. Current PIN - <PIN>. For 
security reasons, change your PIN as soon as possible. 
The message flow between the Agent and the FTM can be protected with the 
established session keys, where all messages are sent encrypted and contain a 
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MAC for integrity. This will occur at steps 2 and 3, but the other steps are 
unprotected.  
Step 4, Activation Request, does not include the Agent’s identification in the initial 
proposal. We suggest that such identification should be added to this message, for 
two reasons: to inform the User of his Agent (the User can only be registered at one 
Agent at a time), and to prevent from possible Agent impersonation attacks. 
The protection mechanism between the User and the FTM raises some difficulties 
due to the fact that we cannot impose certain device requirements to the User’s 
device. Maybe the device has enough computational power to implement a 
protection mechanism similar to the one we propose for the communication between 
the Agent and the FTM, but this is not a certainty. Besides, the performance of the 
USSD channel may be a drawback in this case and the User may choose not to use 
the service if the communications take too long. Anyway, even if we do not assume 
that the communication between the User and the FTM is protected by a set of 
shared secret keys that change from time to time, security can be increased if three 
final steps are added to the process: 
7. Secret Code Hand Out. Agent gives the User a sealed envelope with a secret 
code matrix. The Agent does not know the matrix itself, but the envelope is 
marked with a serial number that identifies the matrix in the FTM platform. 
8. Secret Code Hand Out Notification. Agent sends a message to FTM with the 
User MSISDN and the secret matrix serial number. 
9. Secret Code Hand Out Information. FTM sends the User a message 
indicating that the matrix serial is associated to the User 
Matrix number <matrix serial number> was attributed to you. 
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Step 7 will provide the system with an out-of-band verification, while step 8 will 
inform the system of the matrix associated to the user. The matrix codes will be used 
to confirm future user transactions. Step 9 will confirm to the user that the Agent took 
the correct procedure. 
The matrix secret codes sealed envelopes should be provided to the Agent by the 
FTM system, at his request. This way the FTM will be able to keep a track of the 
envelopes distributed. As usual in other cases, the User must be instructed to refuse 
the matrix envelope if it shows any sign of being tampered. In case the User looses 
the secret code matrix, he simply should go to an Agent, proceed with a code 
cancelation and asks for a new one. This process is not covered here. Notice that 
because Agents need to apply for the role, we expect them to present a certain 
guarantee of honesty. We also expect that the User is aware of the registration steps 
he must follow and is able to detect if an eventually dishonest Agent gives him an 
open code envelope (it should be closed and sealed) or none at all, and knows how 
to present a complaint about that Agent incorrect procedure. 
 
5.3 User Deposit 
Recalling the User deposit process, describe in 3.2: 
1. Presentation: User physically goes to the Agent and hands out the amount of 
money. 
2. Deposit Request: Agent sends a message to the FTM, with the User MSISDN 
and the amount. 
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3. Deposit Acknowledge: FTM validates the message and, if correct, replies to 
the Agent: 
The <currency> <amount> was deposited successfully on the client 
<MSISDN> account.  
4. Deposit Information: FTM sends a message to the User: 
<currency> <amount> were deposited in your account. 
Like before, the messages exchanged between the Agent and the FTM system will 
be protected with the USSL/UTLS session keys. Step 4 is a confirmation to the Use 
that the Agent sent the correct information to the FTM platform. If step 4, Deposit 
Information, is modified to include the user balance he will have an extra means to 
confirm that he has not been the victim of any attack to his account, but if this 
information is to be sent as a regular, unencrypted message, then the balance 
information should be omitted. Yet, we suggest that this message is modified to 
include the Agent identification (his name, at least). 
 
5.4 User Withdrawal 
Recalling the process described in 3.3: 
1. User Withdrawal Request: User sends a message to the FTM, indicating his 
PIN and the amount to withdraw. 
2. Withdrawal Authorization: FTM validates the message and, if successful, 
generates a voucher code, identifying specifically the withdraw of the amount 
requested, and sends a message to the User: 
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Your request was successful. To withdraw <currency> <amount> from 
your account go to the Agent and show the code <voucher code>. 
3. Presentation: User goes to the Agent and presents the voucher code. 
4. Agent Withdrawal Request: Agent sends a message to FTM, with his own PIN 
and the voucher code. 
5. Withdrawal Verification: FTM validates the message and, if successful, replies 
to the Agent: 
Voucher <voucher code> was successfully withdrawn. Deliver 
<currency><amount> to the client. 
6. Withdrawal Information: FTM sends message to the User: 
Agent will deliver you <currency><amount> that were withdrawn from 
your account. 
7. Withdrawal: Agent gives the requested amount to the User.  
The attack were an adversary gains access to the User’s device and is able to 
retrieve sensitive information out of the device’s list of previously dialed numbers, 
namely, is able to obtain the User’s PIN out of the Step 1 message, can be 
prevented if the protocol is modified in such a way that the User never sends his PIN 
without being requested to. In this case, Step 1 should be modified in order to 
include 2 extra steps: 
1'. User Withdrawal Request: User sends a message to the FTM, indicating the 
amount to withdraw. 
2'. User Identification Request: FTM replies to the User, asking for his PIN: 
Please insert your PIN. 
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3'. User Identification: User inserts his PIN. 
Then, the other steps would follow. 
Again, the only messages that are able to be protected by our protocol are the ones 
described in steps 4 and 5. If the User device is able to perform some encryption and 
hash computation, we could use a USSL/UTLS session handshake to provide for the 
User and FTM session keys, and all the following messages between the User and 
the FTM could be encrypted. Because we cannot assume that, we propose a simple 
modification to the protocol, with more two intermediate steps after original step 1, or 
corrected step 3’, as described below: 
a. User Withdrawal Verification Request: FTM validates the message and if 
correct sends the User another message asking for a certain code in his 
secret code matrix: 
Please confirm your request with code from coordinate <matrix 
coordinate>. 
b. User Withdrawal Verification: User answers with the requested value. 
Although these new steps do not fully prevent from an eavesdropper to collect 
information on the User’s secret code matrix and latter impersonate the User to the 
FTM and withdraw money from the user’s account, the attack will be more difficult 
this way. We have already presented some other mechanisms that can further 
protect this type of attack. 
Again, social engineering attacks can be prevented if the User is instructed to ignore 
messages from the FTM that do not show a watermark or seal of origin mark, but 
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this protection mechanism may be difficult to implement in category 1 devices, if not 
impossible. 
There is another problem with the initial message flow: if the Agent does not have 
enough cash on hand for a withdrawal, he would know it only after presenting the 
voucher to the FTM system. The problem can be solved simply if on step 3, 
Presentation the User also informs the Agent of the amount to withdraw, a value the 
Agent will confirm after sending the voucher code to the FTM. This implies that the 
Agent has to trust the value the User told him is correct. Another possibility is to add 
an extra 2-step Agent Withdraw Confirmation after step 3, where the FTM asks the 
Agent if he can support the withdrawal transaction. If he says yes, the procedure will 
continue, but if he says no, the voucher is canceled and the transaction is undone. 
Another security concern is related to the Agent unequivocal identification in the 
message. MSISDN identifiers are not very user-friendly, so Agent and User names 
should also be used and checked against the MSISDN (this does not mean that the 
name should be unique, but the combination of name and MSISDN must be unique). 
This would prevent attacks were an adversary stoles a User’s device that includes a 
voucher and tries to withdraw the money. If the device MSISDN is checked against a 
name, this attack would be difficult to success and this procedure would also 
minimize the impact of typos. 
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Chapter 6  
Implementation 
Our proposal as not been implemented yet, but we foresee that some issues need to 
be addressed when developing the necessary code.  
 
6.1 FTM Implementation 
While we do not expect any kind of problems for the FTM platform, that we assume 
to be a set of high processing capabilities servers, we present next a list of 
properties and functions that need to exist on the FTM side. 
 A pair of public/private keys. The Agents will have access to the FTM’s public 
key, which will allow them to start a USSL/UTLS session. 
 A database of each Agent’s secret code, or a set of secret codes, if the option for 
a code matrix is used. Each record must keep track of the Agent’s code validity, 
the number of consecutive fails, and the number of times the Agent tried to start a 
USSL/UTLS session in a hour (or another gap of time that is more suitable). This 
value will allow the FTM platform to detect if the number of sessions is within a 
normal utilization level or, on the contrary, it is too high for the Agent’s profile, and 
hence we may suspect that a DoS attack is occurring by replaying the Agent’s 
older messages, for instance. 
68 
 
 A database of User’s secret codes or code matrixes. Each record will keep track 
of the User’s secret code serial number as well as the Agent’s ID. Every time a 
Agent delivers a sealed secret code envelope to a User, he must send the 
envelope’s serial number to the platform, along with the user’s MSISDN. This will 
be recorded in the FTM database, as well as the date of delivery. Again, the FTM 
platform should keep track of how many times the User failed to correctly indicate 
the requested code, the maximum number of transactions expected within an 
hour (or another amount of time considered more suitable), and if a code matrix 
is used, the secret codes already used. This registry will help detect anomalous 
usage of the service. 
 The User database account settings should also include a limit for the amount of 
e-money the User is authorized to withdraw. For this case, we suggest that the 
FTM service strongly advises for each User to indicate that amount, for security 
reasons. 
 
6.2 Device Implementation 
Implementing this security service on the device needs to take into consideration the 
device’s category. As we stated before, category 1 devices will allow for very limited 
secured USSD service application, if any at all, but for category 2 and 3 we expect to 
implement a USSD application with a certain level of security. We assumed that the 
Agent’s device would have some advanced processing capabilities, so we can 
impose that the Agent possess at least a device of category 2 and that it is able to 
encrypt, decrypt and perform hash computations. This can be done through STK 
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applications, taking some advantage on the SIM’s secure capabilities, or if a 
category 3 device is present, use the devices TCB component to perform these 
tasks. 
STK and the USAT enable the SIM to initiate actions that can be used for value-
added services delivered over mobile devices. This enables the SIM to provide an 
interactive exchange between a network application and the end-user, and access, 
or control access to the network. For GSM 2G, the STK is defined on [14] and USAT 
for 3G is defined on [15]. STK- based applications are supported by category 2 and 3 
devices and they offer some level of security with SIM-based encryption. There are 
two possibilities of user interfaces: 
1. the customer dials a USSD service on his device and the USSD application 
service will request more information on successive USSD messages or 
2. the operator installs an application that will have its menus embedded in the 
normal device user interface. 
The first approach is simpler to implement, but requires that the Agent or User are 
familiar with the USSD service structure. It may be difficult for infrequent users, but 
experienced ones will find this approach more efficient. Anyway, the USSD service 
implemented should not allow for the User to send sensitive information in the first 
message, in order prevent from reading out of the previously dialed numbers phone 
list. 
As for the second approach, the costumer can send a first USSD message to the 
operator to request the service and is then commanded to download a SIM 
application to reside in his device in the standard phone menu. 
70 
 
For devices of category 3, more solutions are possible, besides the ones presented 
before. A Android smartphone application may be downloaded from the Android 
Market, and other devices may also provide more advanced applications from the 
OS provider store, like AppStore for the iPhone. 
Whatever solution is implemented, the developer must have a common main 
concern: the USSD service must delete all previous messages and associated 
information from the device’s records, so that no critical information is accessible 
through the device’s memory in case and adversary has access to it. This is 
especially true for the case where a long term key or PIN is used. 
A survey on available open-source code for SSL libraries for embedded system 
showed that there are already some solutions that can be explored and adapted if 
needed. Some of the available solutions are presented next. 
 
6.2.1 CyaSSL2 
CyaSSL is an embedded SSL library, C-language-based, targeted for embedded 
RTOS environments, that claims to be small, fast and possess a good feature set. 
The library is available for a variety of OS, including Linux and embedded Linux, 
Android, iPhone, etc. According to the site specification, CyaSSL uses the following 
cryptographic libraries: CTaoCrypt, Crypto++ and NTRU, which provide RSA, DES, 
3DES, MD5, SHA-1, DSA, Diffie-Hellman and AES-256 cipher suites. It also 
                                                          
2
 http://www.yassl.com/yaSSL/Home.html 
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supports random number generator, large Integer support, and base 16/64 
encoding/decoding. 
This library is open source and free download of the source code is available as long 
as the user adheres to version two of the GPL license. A commercial use of the 
library requires commercial licensing. 
 
6.2.2 PolarSSL3 
PolarSSL claims to be an SSL library written in ANSI-C that makes easy for 
developers to include cryptographic and SSL/TLS capabilities in their embedded 
products. It is characterized for its small memory footprint, portability, whose code is 
easy to reduce and expand and with no external dependencies on other libraries 
other than libc. This library offers several cryptographic algorithms, like AES, DES, 
Triple DES for ciphers, MD5, SHA-1 for cryptographic hash functions, RSA, DSA and 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange for public-key cryptography. 
The licensing is done according to the dual licensing model, under the open source 
GPL version 2 as well as a closed source commercial license. 
  
                                                          
3
 http://polarssl.org/ 
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Chapter 7  
Performance Analysis 
In this chapter we will make some considerations related to performance analysis of 
our proposal. To our analysis, the performance of this proposal is dependent mainly 
on five things: 
 Device capabilities. This is due to the type of device used. Assuming only the 
Agent’s type of device, the one that is requested to process hash 
computations, encrypt and decrypt, the performance will be affected by the 
type of device he possess. Even category 2 devices can perform better or 
worse, depending on its processor or amount of memory. The same applies to 
category 3 devices, adding to the fact that this type of devices may include 
many more applications that will compete for processor and memory. 
 FTM servers’ capabilities. Mainly, FTM servers will compute hashes, encrypt, 
decrypt update databases and log transactions. We expect FTM servers to 
have increased processing capabilities, multi-processing, etc, so hash 
computations and encryption/decryption will have good performance. 
Database access and logging will depend on the number of transactions 
requested, but will mostly comply with a certain level of performance. 
 Number of messages exchanged. Obviously, the more messages, the worse 
for the service performance. 
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 Transmission time of the USSD protocol. Transmission time depends on the 
distance each device is to a mobile station but will not vary greatly with each 
use. 
 Processing time of the USSD service. This value is difficult to foresee 
because it will include the FTM servers capabilities for one of the sides, and 
the device capabilities for the other side. Some experiments on the 
Portuguese TMN mobile operator showed an average value of 7 seconds for 
each USSD message, but this value greatly depends on the type of service 
that is requested. Simpler services, like the value spent on a call, can take up 
to 3 seconds, while more complex ones, like the information about the 
remaining value to spend, which involves database consulting and data 
processing, may take up to 22 seconds. If database access and logging on 
the FTM side is done in background whenever possible, this service will 
mainly demand the use of cryptographic functions on each side, so 
processing time will be mostly dependent on the performance of those 
function at each device or server. 
The number of messages cannot be further reduced without compromising the 
security properties that are the main goal of this work, but it is possible to limit the 
number of times the Agent need to establish a secure session. For example, the 
keys are stored in the device, with an associated timestamp, that will invalidate them 
after some time and force the process to be restarted. 
USSD provides an adjustable timeout value for each message. The default is 600 
seconds, but during the first phase, this timeout should be the minimum possible. 
Our suggestion is to use a value around 10 seconds. No user intervention is required 
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other than starting the application. USSD is a real-time session-oriented service and 
the session remains open until the user, application, or time-out releases it. For the 
Agent authentication phase, with a timeout of 10 seconds per message, the 
agreement of the shared Master Secret would take a maximum of 100 seconds. For 
user-friendlyness of the service there should be some feedback to the Agent for 
each step, in the form of a progress bar, for instance. 
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Chapter 8  
Further discussion and analysis 
As mentioned before, there are some limitations when trying to use a secure protocol 
in some old devices. Although this proposal tries to put the maximum effort on the 
FTM side, some computation has to be done on the device side. But SSL/TSL has a 
major advantage of being a well-known protocol, and this solution can be extended 
to other communication channels with limited bandwidth, like Bluetooth, RFID, etc. 
Another advantage of this solution is that we are able to change the cryptographic 
library and deal simultaneously with different versions of the protocol only on the 
FTM side. This allows having several levels of security enforcements, depending if 
we are dealing with category 2 mobile devices, or category 3 smartphones with TCB 
components. This information may be of great use if the communications between 
the User and the FTM are to be secured as well. Our suggestion is that the protocol 
version should be a configuration value introduced during the application installation 
in the User’s device and should only be allowed alterations if the user goes 
physically to the operator location and presents his reasons: a new mobile device to 
be registered, or a software upgrade, for instance. Otherwise, the protocol version to 
use should be fixed and protected. In other words, it should prevent dumbing down 
attacks. 
The USSD application on the FTM platform should be implement in such a way that 
withdrawal and other transaction limits should be read from a configuration database 
that would include not only the client account id, his account type but also his 
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protocol version. The reasons why this should be included on the FTM databases 
and not only the phone itself is to prevent attacks where the adversary is able to 
modify this value in order to access a higher withdrawal limit. The information sent by 
the mobile device is checked against the information stored in the FTM databases. If 
they match, the operation is allowed, otherwise, we may be in the presence of an 
attack to the system, the transaction should be aborted and an appropriated log and 
alarm should be generated. 
The proposed solution includes the hashing of the messages exchanged between 
the Agent and the FTM, which will provide for the integrity of the messages that can 
be checked at both sides. Also, the secrets exchanges are also hashed, either with 
SHA-1 or MD5, or with the MACAgent session key, which will change every time the 
Agent starts a new USSL/UTLS session. 
Authentication is supported through the PIN value for both the User and the Agent. 
Confirmation of their identity can also be achieved through the use of the out-of-band 
secret code request. Both mechanisms will also provide non-repudiation of the 
operations being executed, but this is only valid for the User and Agent sides. The 
FTM authentication and non-repudiation to the Agent is only guaranteed by the use 
of the FTM’s public key, but we have not suggested any type of FTM certificate 
verification on the Agent side, other than FTM Certificate verification to a devices 
pre-installed one, because that would require access to a Certification Authority, 
which may not be possible. Besides, checking against a pre-installed Certificate has 
some disadvantages: certification revocation will be very difficult and a virus or other 
malicious application may be able to change or delete the FTM’s certificate. As for 
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the User, communications are not encrypted and he is not able to certify that the 
FTM is not being impersonated by a malicious adversary. 
User MSISDN alone cannot be considered a good authentication method because it 
can be spoofed, but can be used it to detect misused or possible attack of the 
service, for instance, if the same MSISDN is active at the same time in different 
mobile cells. 
As for communications confidentiality, it is only assured between the Agent and the 
FTM through the use of session encryption keys. Our proposal does not cover User 
communications encryption although this is also possible if certain requirements are 
met, like the User’s device is, at least, a category 2 device. 
We have proposed a protocol that follows SSL/TLS standards but when defining 
some optional parts of the standard our advice is to follow TLS standard rather than 
SSL’s. Although similar, SSL 3.0 implementation is considered slightly weaker than 
the TLS 1.0 implementation. Our solution is a lightweight version of the standard, 
and we suggested the use of a maximum of two cipher suites. This will provide some 
protection against downgrade of the protocols to a less secure version or to a 
weaker one. 
Attacks to the SSL/TLS protocols are reported periodically, as well as theoretical 
studies of possible attacks. These reports and studies conduct to bug fixes, 
recommendations and stronger algorithm implementations, and although many of 
them are related to the standard use of the protocol over TCP, some of them may 
apply as well to USSD communication channel, so developers of this service should 
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maintain a close attention to these reports in order to fix possible cryptographic 
vulnerabilities on the system. 
PIN change command is not in the scope of this work, but a mechanism to prevent 
social engineering attacks as suggested in previous chapters, with a watermark or 
seal of origin character, could be used whenever the User (or Agent) issues a PIN 
change command. Also, every message sent to the Agent or User should include 
this special mark. The owner of the device should be aware that without that mark he 
can be the victim of a phishing message or other malicious attack. The 
implementation of this security mechanism may be very difficult in category 1 
devices, if not impossible, but for category 2 and higher, this mechanism will train the 
device owner to search for marks of credibility in applications. Of course, the 
transmission of the mark should be tamper-proof and resistant to replay and 
guessing attacks. 
The fact that the User is only able to be registered at one single Agent may look like 
a inflexible option but provides some extra securities assurances: the User will only 
have to memorize one PIN and carry one secret-code matrix envelope, it will be 
easier to control MSISDN spoofing, because the Agent’s MSISDN will be paired with 
the User’s MSISDN, so any other combination must be interpreted as an attack. It is 
also easier to detect and manage if an attacker is doing PIN guessing on a robbed or 
lost device and block the User’s account. 
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Chapter 9  
Suggestions for future work 
This work is only a proposal for a small part of the FTM system. Some issues are 
intentionally not covered. 
 
9.1 FTM authentication to the User 
This may only be possible if the User and the FTM share a secret or if the User is 
able to verify the FTM certification. 
For the first case, the shared secret should be given to each other when certain 
conditions are met, like when they are physically near each other, for instance, the 
User is at the FTM’s facilities and they acknowledge each other, or through another 
TTP, like an Agent or any other entity that both trust. But having the Agent certifying 
the FTM’s identity is not a good solution: the Agent itself is not authenticated to the 
User and he may be malicious and collude with a malicious FTM in order to deceive 
the User and lead him to deliver them his money or other type of sensitive 
information. 
The second case requires that the User receives the FTM’s certification and is able 
to contact some kind of certification authority in order to verify the FTM’s identity. 
This requires User’s advanced processing capabilities as well as another 
82 
 
communications channel to a trusted authority that would increase the complexity of 
the system’s architecture. 
FTM authentication to the User may be impossible if they have not previously met 
and if the User only possess a category 1 device, but for the other cases, is a line of 
work that deserves to be explored. 
As referred before, the inverse situation of the User authentication to the FTM is 
resolved through the use of PINs, shared secret codes and the MSISDN of the 
User’s device. A solution similar to the one presented in [13] may be used to 
increase the User’s PIN security, especially when transmitted unencrypted on a 
USSD message, This study suggests that the PIN should be modified and combined 
in a certain manner with a code from an external source every time the User needs 
to initiate a transaction. This would provide one time keys and prevent PIN guessing 
attacks, but User’s may be resistant to use a solution that requires for PIN 
modification every time and it will not provide confidentiality not integrity of the 
transactions. 
 
9.2 Agent – User mutual authentication 
As noted before, the Agent and the User do not authenticate each other, but the 
communications flow of each transaction imposes that the User acknowledges of 
everything the Agent commands the FTM respecting the User’s account. Yet, the 
problem of having the User and the Agent authenticate each other, especially the 
first time they meet, may be solved if we consider the FTM as a TTP. 
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If we can use the FTM as a TTP, the platform may send a message to the User with 
a special code, and another message to the Agent with another code. Then, the 
User would have to reply the FTM with the Agent’s code, and the Agent would do the 
same with the User’s code. The FTM would combine the User’s answer with the 
code sent previously to the User, and would also combine the Agent’s answer with 
the code sent to him. The result of each combination would be sent to the 
participants, one to each other, and they would have to check visually if the values 
were same and confirm it to the FTM. The FTM would already know that the values 
were the same or not, but with this confirmation the FTM may be certain that they 
have truly acknowledged each other. This type of confirmation goes in the clear on 
the User’s side, so further analysis would be needed in order to detect and mitigate 
vulnerabilities in this scheme. 
One other aspect of the system could be used to authenticate the User and the 
Agent for the first time: they have to be physically near each other. The User and the 
Agent are able to visually check the information that each other receives from the 
FTM. An interesting work that explores the fact that both unauthenticated parties are 
physically near to each other is presented in [10]. Although the work refers to camera 
phones and bar-code readers, which require, at least, category 2 devices, the 
proposed solution imposes no prior knowledge of the participants or the use of a 
TTP. 
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9.3 FTM authentication to the Agent 
This aspect was not covered in this work, mainly because it would require that the 
Agent has also a certificate or a set of public/private keys. The number of steps in 
the authentication phase would increase, but even so, the protocol could be altered 
to comply with this requirement and performance analysis would have to be 
conducted in order conclude on the impact of these extra steps. 
 
9.4 User confidentiality 
As noted throughout the work, there is no encryption on the User’s communications 
to the FTM. This aspect could be studied in order to find a solution, even if it does 
not fit all devices’ categories, to protect the User’s communications. As noted before, 
the fact that an eavesdropper is able to listen to Users USSD communication may 
endanger him: not only is he giving away security information, like his PIN and other 
secret codes, he is also transmitting information about his account, the amount of 
money he is carrying and the amount of money he is going to receive.  
For category 2 and 3 devices, a solutions similar to the one we propose for the Agent 
communication is possible, although that solution would have to take into account 
the fact that presently, the User is unknown to the FTM until he registers with an 
Agent. How much would such a solution impact on performance, and what could be 
done to category 1 devices is something that should be addressed in future works. 
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9.5 Human-Errors 
One problem that is not discussed in this work is how to correct for human error. For 
example, the Agent may incorrectly introduce the User’s MSISDN when sending a 
deposit message to the FTM. This may cause the money to incorrectly being 
deposited in another User’s account. The error will be detected because the User will 
not receive the corresponding Deposit Information message, but the procedures to 
allow the Agent to correct this mistake were not shown. This aspect deserves more 
analysis, Human error is something that we have to account for when introducing 
values into the system and we need to provide a means for detecting and correcting 
them. 
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Chapter 10  
Summary and Conclusions 
This work analyses an existing m-finance scheme and proposes some modifications 
in order to improve its security over the USSD communication channel.  
USSD itself is not secure, but it is available everywhere and is inter-operable, i.e. is 
not telecom dependent. Besides, it requires no new hardware, and requires 
practically no software download. Its issues relative to security and confidentiality 
can be addressed through the use of secure protocols on top of it. Despite so, its 
simplicity will not allow for a very complex application and is not an ergonomic 
solution, but it suits a certain market very well. 
We analyzed system the treat model, considering the existing transactions, and we 
proposed a solution that would protect a certain path of the communication, namely, 
between the Agent and the FTM. We suggested the implementation of SSL/TLS over 
USSD, a lightweight version that we called USSL/UTLS. Such implementation of the 
SSL/TLS protocol is actually independent of the communication channel used. The 
same mechanism we proposed can be used if the communication if done over 
bluetooth, NFC, WiFi, or other. The main advantage of our proposal is the fact that 
SSL/TLS is a standard that is still considered secure, but in case it suffers any 
evolution that increases its security, that modification can easily be deployed in our 
solution, with little modification of message flow already implemented. 
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In conclusion, we are convinced that our proposal for using USSL/UTLS can be 
implemented in current category 2 and 3 devices and that it increases the security in 
Agent – FTM communications. It also requires a minimum of user intervention and 
provides extra security measures that authenticate the Agent, and provides 
information integrity and confidentiality. 
  
89 
 
References 
[1]  ETSI: Digital Cellular Telecommunications System; Unstructured 
Supplementary Service Data (USSD) – Stage 1 (GSM 02.90). Technical 
Report, ETSI, March 1997 
[2]  ETSI: Digital Cellular Telecommunications System; Unstructured 
Supplementary Service Data (USSD) – Stage 2 (GSM 03.90). Technical 
Report, ETSI, December 1996 
[3]  ETSI: Digital Cellular Telecommunications System; Unstructured 
Supplementary Service Data (USSD) – Stage 3 (GSM 04.90 version 5.0.1). 
Technical Report, ETSI, May 1997 
[4]  Paik, M.: “Stragglers of the herd get eaten: security concerns for GSM mobile 
banking applications”. HotMobile '10: Proceedings of the Eleventh Workshop 
on Mobile Computing Systems & Applications, pp 54-59, Annapolis, Maryland, 
USA, 22-23 February, 2010 
[5]  Sarajlic, A.; Omerasevic, D.: “Access Channels in m-Commerce Services”. 29th 
International Conference on Information Technology Interfaces, ITI 2007, pp 
507-512, June 25-28, 2007, Cavtat, Croatia 
[6]  Kumar, D.; Martin, D.; O’Neill, J.: “The Times They Are A-Changin’: Mobile 
Payments in India”. CHI ’11 Proceedings of the 2011 Annual Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing System, pp 1413-1422, May 7–12, 2011, 
Vancouver, BC, Canada 
[7]  Barkan, E.; Biham, E.; Keller, N.: “Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of 
GSM Encrypted Communication”. Journal of Cryptology, Volume 21 Issue 3, pp 
392-429, March 2008 
[8]  Karunanayake, A.; De Zoysa, K.; Muftic, S.: “Mobile ATM for developing 
countries”. MobiArch '08: Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on 
Mobility in the evolving internet architecture, pp 25-30, August 22, 2008, Seatle, 
WA, USA 
[9]  McKitterick, D.; Dowling, J.: “State of the Art Review of Mobile Payment 
Technology”. TCD Computer Science Technical Reports, TCD-CS-2003-24, pp 
22, 2003, Department of Computer Science, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 
[10]  McCune, J. M.; Perrig, A.; Reiter, M.K.: “Seeing-Is-Believing: using camera 
phones for human-verifiable authentication”. International Journal of Security 
and Networks, Volume 4 Issue 1/2, pp.43–56, February 2009 
[11]  Toorani, M.; Shirazi, A. A. B.: “Solutions to the GSM Security Weaknesses”. 
NGMAST ’08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Second International Conference 
90 
 
on Next Generation Mobile Applications, Services, and Technologies, pp.576-
581, University of Glamorgan, Cardiff, UK, Sep. 2008  
[12]  Panjwani, S.: “Towards End-to-End Security in Branchless Banking”. HotMobile 
’11, Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, ACM, March 
1–2, 2011, Phoenix, Arizona, USA 
[13]  Panjwani, S.; Cutrell, E.: “Usably Secure, Low-Cost Authentication for Mobile 
Banking”. SOUPS '10: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy 
and Security, Article No. 4, July 14-16, 2010, Redmond, Washington, USA 
[14] ETSI/SMG: GSM 11.14 Standard, Specification of the SIM Application Toolkit 
for the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface. 
http://www.etsi.org, 1996 
[15] 3GPP: 3GPP TS 31.111, Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) 
Application Toolkit (USAT). http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/31111.htm, 
2011 
 
